Race, Trade, and the Demise of Southern Support for Multilateralism, 1945-62

Abstract

Southern members of Congress were once the strongest supporters of multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy, nearly unanimously backing the League of Nations and other multilateral initiatives in the early 20th Century, as well as the United Nations during and after World War II. By the end of the 1950s, though, many of them had turned sharply against this institutional form. This paper assesses two possible explanations for this change. First, multilateral rules on human rights threatened the institutions of white supremacy in the South beginning in the late 1940s. This system was incompatible with any reasonable interpretation of the human rights norms promoted through the United Nations. Second, labor-intensive industries, especially textiles, began moving into the South in the early 20th Century take advantage of lower labor costs. These protectionist industries eroded the predominance of the agricultural export sector, especially cotton, reducing the economic benefits of multilateral cooperation. An analysis of roll-call voting in the House of Representatives on issues related to multilateralism finds evidence for both these lines of argument, though the defense of racial hierarchy appears to be the most important consideration.

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Why did Southern members of Congress, once the leading advocates of multilateralism in American foreign policy, turn against this international institutional form in the two decades after World War II? This change is a major reason for the paradoxical role of multilateralism in American foreign policy since that time. Multilateral rules are a central feature of the international order that most American leaders have promoted since 1945, yet the United States has refused to officially accept many of these rules, including some that American policy makers pioneered. To illustrate the change in Southern elite views of multilateralism, consider the positions that two Southern members of Congress--both leading voices on foreign policy within the Democratic Party--took on major multilateral initiatives at different points in time.

On March 5, 1912, Mississippi Senator John Sharp Williams gave a long speech on the Senate floor supporting arbitration treaties that the Taft administration had negotiated with Britain and France. Treaty supporters like Williams expected these agreements to be the first steps toward a multilateral system of compulsory arbitration of international disputes. Opponents, mainly from within the President's own Republican Party, focused on how such agreements might limit American freedom of action. Concerns involved not only international matters but also domestic policies on which foreign states might demand arbitration. Opponents like Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had raised the possibility that Japan might demand arbitration over Western states' laws limiting Japanese immigration and segregating Japanese immigrants and their children in public schools. Williams dismissed these concerns, pointing to safeguards in the treaty.[1] He argued that expanding the reach of international law was worth accepting what he viewed as minor limits on American autonomy. "The objection has actually been made to this treaty today that the United States would be surrendering some of its sovereignty… There never was a treaty entered into by the United States Government, nor by any other government for that matter, that did not waive for the nonce and, to the extent of the concession made, surrender the exercise of some sovereign power. Just as when you and I make an agreement, a compromise, I surrender some right in my opinion and your surrender some in yours and to that extent curtail an otherwise discretionary

[1] *Congressional Record*, 5 March 1912, pp. 2825. Williams joined the Foreign Relations Committee the following year, serving on it from 1913 until he left the Senate in 1923 (U.S. Senate 2000, 77). While he cooperated with Lodge through the first part of his tenure, what he viewed as Lodge's sabotage of the Versailles Treaty resulted in a permanent enmity between the two Senators (Osborn 1943, 348-9). See, for example, Williams' denunciation of Lodge's committee report on the treaty, *Congressional Record*, 11 September 1919, 5232-6.

sovereignty." Williams' frustration with those who quibbled over what he saw as minor risks occasionally boiled over. "When a man tells me he is willing to arbitrate and then goes on and refines and defines until he substantially says 'I am willing to arbitrate anything in the world in such a way that it will not be settled against me,' then the man is not willing to arbitrate at all. If that is all, let us just quit the whole foolishness."[2] President Taft shared Williams' conviction on this point. When the Senate attached sweeping reservations before approving the resolution of ratification, Taft set the treaties aside.

Nearly 40 years later, another prominent Southern member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Walter George (D-GA), addressed another treaty committing the United States to respect certain multilateral rules. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide had been before the Foreign Relations Committee for nearly two years. Its advocates wanted it reported out of committee so that the Senate could vote on ratification. Speaking at a September 17, 1951, executive session of the Committee, George's position was a mirror image of Williams'. Williams had dismissed alleged threats to U.S. sovereignty; George took them very seriously. He contended that the Genocide Convention and other UN human rights measures would inevitably result in unwanted changes in domestic law. "And then there is the human rights thing [the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. Both of them are filled with subtle and obscure and double meaning things that really aim to attack the constitutional setup that we have under our dual system. I am just against it." Agreements like these would eventually result in the prosecution of Americans--"a Governor of Massachusetts or Georgia"--by an international tribunal. He rejected reassurances based on safeguards in the treaty, some of which were ironically offered by Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), the grandson and namesake of Williams' old antagonist. Where Williams had been willing to accept some limits on American freedom of action to advance the cause of international law, George saw only risks. "We are just not careful enough, gentlemen, in these treaties, and this is one of those loose treaties that should never have been made, and the only thing you can say about it is that it is just not quite as bad as the other one that they drew up on human rights or the universal bill of rights, or whatever you call the thing." Where Williams had shown anger at what he saw as his opponents' overstated concerns, George expressed equally strong feelings in defense of those

[2] *Congressional Record*, 5 March 1912, pp. 2831.

same concerns. "Of course it has a good purpose. Lord Heavens, that's where the trouble comes in this world, that you set up a good purpose and everybody is for it, regardless of how you are going to do it."[3] The committee did not send the Genocide Convention to the Senate floor in 1951. It remained unratified until 1986.

Although these debates took place under different historical conditions, the stakes were similar in some key respects. In both cases, the Senate was considering a treaty that would commit the country to a set of multilateral rules. These rules fit John Ruggie's definition of multilateralism, "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct--that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence."[4] Supporters of both treaties hoped the relatively narrow measure under consideration would lead to a broader set of multilateral rules. The Taft administration presented the 1912 arbitration treaties with Britain and France as models for agreements with other states, ultimately leading to a universal system of compulsory arbitration.[5] The Genocide Convention was the first of a series of human rights treaties then being negotiated under UN auspices.[6] It was precisely this broader multilateral agenda that worried opponents in both instances. The crux of both debates was whether the order that a system of multilateral rules would produce was worth the constraints it might impose on the foreign and domestic policies of the United States.

In principle, those concerned about the potential constraints of multilateralism might have accepted some rules but rejected others. In practice, it is difficult to enter into multilateral commitments selectively. No single state, not even one as powerful as the United States after 1945, can entirely control the scope and content of all multilateral rules, let alone their interpretation in practice. Uncertainty arising from this lack of full control was the root of Walter George's concern about the prosecution of state governors under the Genocide Convention. Claiming exemption from some widely accepted multilateral rules while demanding compliance

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[3] U.S. Senate 1976, 381-2.

[4] Ruggie 1992, 571.

[5] Concerning the broader goals of the arbitration movement and the role of the 1912 treaties, see Boyle 1999, 25-36; and Coates 2016, 86-106; and Kuehl 1969, 137-143.

[6] Concerning the role of the Genocide Convention in the broader planned UN human rights treaties, see Brucken 2013, esp. 171-209; and Kaufman 1990, 37-62.

with others amounts to a claim of special privilege that undermines the entire institution of multilateralism. It is essentially the same as refusing to accept a particular rule in some specific cases while insisting on its application in others. The United States has often pursued this course of action, but has encountered significant international resistance in doing so. Not surprisingly, domestic opposition to particular multilateral obligations in the United States has often ended in rejection of the principle of multilateralism itself in favor of a foreign policy resting on the unilateral exercise of the country's considerable international power.

John Sharp Williams' and Walter George's contradictory assessments of multilateralism are emblematic of the broader change in most Southern policymakers' positions on this issue. From Williams' day through World War II, Southerners were the leading advocates of efforts to regulate the international system through multilateral rules. Woodrow Wilson, a Virginia native with whom Williams worked especially closely in promoting U.S. membership in the League of Nations after World War I, is the most famous example.[7] Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell Hull, a former Senator from Tennessee, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945 for his role in establishing the United Nations, was arguably more successful. Southern members of Congress nearly unanimously supported both these international organizations. Alfred Hero's extensive examination of newspaper editorials and public opinion polls shows that the broader public in the South generally took the same position.[8] As George's views suggest, things had begun to change by the early 1950s. Emerging Southern skepticism extended beyond human rights agreements to include nearly all multilateral rules. George appears to have moved in this direction relatively early, but most Southern members of Congress soon joined him.[9] The trend extended to Southern newspapers and civic organizations by the end of the 1950s, spreading to public opinion in the early 1960s.[10]

This decline in Southern elite support for multilateralism has had enormous consequences of the shape of American foreign policy and the postwar world order. Working with conservative Republicans, who have a much longer history of opposition to the multilateral rules, they were able to prevent American participation in a range of multilateral agreements, ranging from the

[7] Concerning Williams' collaboration with Woodrow Wilson, see Osborn 1943, 206; Fry 2002, 173.
[8] Hero 1965, 223-32.
[9] Lerche 1964, 28-29.
[10] Hero 1965, 232-43.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to the International Criminal Court. The alliance between these two factions, which deepened as Southern conservatives moved from the Democratic to the Republican Party is largely responsible for the peculiar fact that while the international order that United States policymakers have promoted since World War II may be "rules-based," the United States officially rejects many of the rules that constitute it.[11]

Understanding the reasons for this shift is important for theoretical as well as historical reasons. Like other changes in the positions political factions take on foreign policy issues, it is a window onto the considerations shaping what these factions see as the "national interest." In this case, the potentially important effect of the changing role of race in international politics, and its interaction with the domestic racial hierarchy in the United States, is especially interesting. Borrowing from the open economy politics research program in the field of international political economy, many accounts of the origins of political divisions over foreign policy have focus on changing exposure to the international economy.[12] In this case, local variation in the impact of change in both the racial order and exposure to the international economy allow us to assess the importance of both sets of considerations side by side in an important case.

Explaining the Demise of Southern Support for Multilateralism

The shift in the Southern position on multilateralism in Congress was a broad phenomenon that happened relatively quickly. It involved both changes of position by individual members as well as the replacement of longstanding members with new arrivals who took different positions. It thus cannot be explained entirely in terms of the minds of individual members. Broader changes in the world that affected their societal constituencies bode larger. The idiosyncratic ways that individual members reacted to these forces remains interesting and important, but they have to be understood in the context of larger regional, national, and international processes.

Previous research has proposed two sources of explanation for the change. The first, which is the principal focus of research on human rights agreements in recent decades, involves

[11] See, for example, Beinart 2021. The leading sympathetic treatment of the U.S.-led international order is Ikenberry 2011.

[12] For reviews of the open-economy politics approach, see Lake 2009 and Oatley 2011. Applications to the politics of United States foreign policy include Broz 2008; 2011; Milner and Tingley 2016; Trubowitz 1998; Fordham 1998; 2019.

the implications of multilateralism for white supremacy.[13] The second, which was more popular in contemporaneous accounts of the shifting Southern position, involves changes arising from the region's exposure to the global economy.[14] These two lines of argument are different but not mutually exclusive. In this section, I will summarize the processes each one suggests. I will also consider some characteristics of individual members that might have made them more or less likely to attend to pressures to adopt a new position on multilateralism.

Multilateralism and White Supremacy

In the aftermath of World War II, there was a concerted effort in the United Nations to incorporate human rights into international law. It was immediately obvious that the institutions and practices upholding white supremacy in the South were incompatible with any reasonable interpretation of these new rules. Not surprisingly, scholarship concerning the postwar human rights treaties era nearly always identifies Jim Crow as a major reason for growing opposition to these treaties in the U.S. Congress, as well as preemptive efforts by U.S. diplomats to head off this opposition by weakening the agreements during the negotiation process.[15]

The linkage between human rights and multilateralism in the postwar era was new. The League of Nations had no commitment to racial equality comparable to that of the United Nations. Woodrow Wilson and the leaders of the other major powers at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference had thwarted Japanese efforts to include a racial equality clause in the League Covenant.[16] John Sharp Williams, for one, appears to have hoped the League would serve as a vehicle through which the United States and Britain could promote worldwide white supremacy.[17] Concern over the implications of arbitration treaties and the League of Nations for

[13] Research stressing the role of race in changing Southern views on multilateralism includes Hero 1965 and Ulin 2016. Research stressing the role of race in generating Congressional opposition to human rights agreements includes Brucken 2013; Kaufman 1990; Moravcsik 2005; and Ruggie 2005. Because it focuses on a different research question than the one considered here, this work does not always distinguish between conservative Republican opposition to these agreements and that of Southern Democrats.

[14] Although Hero 1965, esp. 139-47, concluded that concerns about racial hierarchy were the most important drivers of the change, he noted that a commitment to free trade had long pushed Southern elites in an internationalist direction on many issues, a tendency that weakened in the 1950s. Seabury 1957, 21-4, and Lerche 1964, 319-21, accorded a greater role to economic change, though only part of this concerned exposure to the global economy. Fry 2002, 222-60, sees more continuity than other observers but discusses the influence of both race and economic change in the early postwar era.

[15] See, for example, Brucken 2013; Kaufman 1990.

[16] Füredi 1998, 41-4; MacMillan 2001, 316-21.

[17] Seabury 1957, 10-11; on Williams' racialized view of cooperation with Britain, see Fry 2002, 154.

legal segregation focused entirely on discrimination against people of Asian descent on the West Coast because China and Japan, as sovereign states, had the standing to take action. There were just two independent African states in 1919, and none with ties of recent immigration to the United States comparable to those of China and Japan. It is telling that John Sharp Williams did not mention Southern segregation in the speech quoted earlier, even though he discussed segregation on the West Coast. Multilateralism posed no threat to Southern racial hierarchy in the early 20th Century. Postwar decolonization changed things, insuring that multilateralism would involve many more predominantly non-white states.

Southern white supremacists also worried about the application of multilateral human rights commitments in U.S. courts. A California state appeals court struck down a law prohibiting land ownership by Japanese non-citizens on the ground that it violated Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even though the Declaration was not supposed to be legally binding. The decision was issued on April 24, 1950, in the midst of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of the Genocide Convention, an agreement that actually was to have the force of international law. The California decision prompted the committee chair, Tom Connally (D-TX), to assert that he would have voted against ratification of the UN Charter if he had known it would be used for this purpose.[18]

The Cold War gave additional cause for concern. While the real pressure to eliminate racial discrimination at home in order to compete with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of newly decolonized states lay some time in the future, Southern political elites attuned to foreign policy could see where things were heading.[19] An exchange from the 1951 debate over the Genocide Convention in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee quoted earlier illustrates this expectation. Brien McMahon (D-CT) had disputed Walter George's assertion that Americans might be tried for genocide before an international tribunal. George responded "What answer would we have, Senator McMahon, to make to the other countries, who said, 'Now the time has come to set it up, and the United States is the most enlightened nation in the world standing in the way of it.'? You would set it up. You would have to set it up."[20]

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[18] Brucken 2013, 156.

[19] Dudziak 2011; Skrentny 1998.

[20] U.S. Senate 1976, 381.

One curious fact about elite opposition to the UN human rights agreements is that its most public faces were not white Southerners but conservative Republicans from the North and West. Frank Holman, the President of the American Bar Association, arguably the most prominent early opponent of these agreements, was born in Utah and practiced law in Seattle. Senator John Bricker, Holman's most important congressional collaborator, was a Republican from Ohio. Both men had much broader objections to the human rights treaties and to the United Nations in general than their impact on Southern segregation.[21] (Indeed, Bricker later voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1957.) Bricker drew on a conservative Republican tradition of opposition to all forms of multilateralism that dated back to the pre-World War I era. For them, opposition to multilateralism was axiomatic.[22]

Southern members of Congress concerned about multilateralism were more reticent than their Republican colleagues. For them, opposing multilateralism meant reversing a position that political leaders in their party and region had held for decades. Doing so carried potential political costs. Public opinion in the South remained at least as supportive of the United Nations as opinion in the rest of the country--perhaps more so--throughout the 1950s. A cautious Southern member of Congress might wonder whether publicly undermining highly visible elements of multilateralism like the United Nations was really necessary. It is worth noting that Walter George made his disparaging comments about human rights treaties in a closed executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Publicly, George had built a reputation as an internationalist and supporter of the UN during World War II. By 1956, he was under attack on these grounds by a prospective primary opponent, Herman Talmadge, and chose not to run for reelection.[23] Reticence of this sort is useful for discerning the drivers of the turn away from multilateralism because those who felt pressures to change more acutely should be more willing to pay the costs of shifting their stance, or, if they refused to do so, of being replaced by a new member who would.

If concerns about white supremacy drove the move away from multilateralism, then some Southern political leaders should be quicker than others to make the change. Nearly all Southern members of Congress participated in the defense of white supremacy but the practical

[21] Kaufman 1990, 16-36.

[22] Fordham and Flynn 2021.

[23] Hero 1965, 8; Lerche 1964, 47.

implications of the system of racial hierarchy were not the same for all of them. Some were more politically vulnerable to a change in the system than others. Racial restrictions on voting rights served to keep power in the hands of an elite associated with the Democratic Party.[24] Members of Congress were part of this group. Those representing districts that had especially large black populations had the most to lose if their black constituents were able to vote. Few white Southern politicians could expect to win over these new voters. Whatever their private views or public statements, they belonged to a party that had done all it could to subordinate them, including the use of violence.

A second important feature of the Southern racial order that had different implications for different members is its role in preserving the region's system of labor-repressive agriculture. This system developed in part to maintain a quiescent agricultural workforce after the abolition of slavery. It did so by restricting the geographic mobility of black agricultural workers, denying them access to education, and subjecting those who resisted to violence. Large landowners provided much of the political support for it and maintained a position of disproportionate influence both through their historical importance in the economy and their disproportionate influence in legislative districting.[25] As if more evidence of the repressive character of this system were needed, recent research suggests that exogenous shocks separating blacks from the cotton economy led to better individual outcomes for those affected, while whites facing similar displacement had about the same life outcomes as other whites.[26] Labor-repressive agriculture was central to the political economy of the South. Jim Crow extended to urban manufacturing industries as well, but it was more important to agriculture. Members of Congress representing districts where agriculture was most economically important should be more sensitive to threats to racial hierarchy, including those stemming from multilateral rules.

These aspects of the system of racial hierarchy imply testable hypotheses about support for multilateralism. Members from districts with larger black populations, or where agriculture was more important, should be more likely to oppose multilateralism.[27] These relationships should become stronger over time after World War II, as the implications of multilateralism for

[24] Mickey 2015, 35.

[25] Feigenbaum, et al. 2020, 1; Mickey 2015, 35-37, 45.

[26] Clay et al. 2020; Feigenbaum, et al. 2020. Wilkerson 2010 vividly illustrates how Jim Crow helped motivate the Great Migration to Northern and Western cities.

[27] Hero 1965, 430, proposes this hypothesis, citing some interesting examples but not formally testing it.

Southern racial hierarchy became increasingly clear. This growing awareness of the threat to racial hierarchy is not merely an effect of time, though, so it need not be smoothly continuous. This is the core of the argument that race altered the attitude of Southern elites toward multilateralism: the implications of engagement with the international system changed. Charles Hero linked this transformation to "the emergence and increasing importance to American foreign policy of independent Africa and, to a lesser extent, other colored nations…."[28] Figure 1 displays the cumulative number of newly decolonized states that joined the UN between 1945 and 1962. The growing number of these states definitely affected the tenor of UN discussions of race and colonialism. Other scholars have proposed more specific break points, including the debate over the Genocide Convention in 1949-50, and the shock of the 1954 school desegregation decision by the Supreme Court.[29]



[28] Hero 1965, 383.

[29] On the Genocide Convention debate as a possible break point, see Ulin 2016, 10; on the school desegregation decision, see Hero 1965, 386, 394.

Multilateralism and Exposure to the Global Economy

The prima facie case for explaining the Southern shift away from multilateralism in terms of its implications for white supremacy is a strong one. However, there are reasons to suspect that there is more going on. Multilateralism was not entirely--or even primarily--about human rights. The postwar era saw much more extensive multilateral cooperation on security issues through organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and on economic issues through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Southern skepticism of multilateralism extended to these other matters in addition to UN treaties on human rights. Indeed, none of the roll-call votes in the analysis that follows concerns a human rights treaty. The few that touch on human rights at all do so only indirectly. Southern politicians may have publicly framed their objections to multilateralism in terms of racial hierarchy (or at least "states' rights") because this approach was most likely to appeal to their white constituents. Other considerations may also have influenced them.

Exposure to the global economy is particularly likely to have been one of these other considerations. Previous research on the postwar era has found that members of Congress representing areas of the country where internationally competitive sectors of the economy predominated were most likely to support key elements of American foreign policy, including those associated with multilateralism.[30] Before World War II, the fact that export-oriented agriculture dominated the Southern economy helps explain Southern elite interest in multilateral cooperation with other developed states, as well as their concern about access to the European markets, a factor leading to support for U.S. intervention in World War II.[31] These economic interests might not have made broadly appealing public justifications for changing foreign policy positions, but members who cared about regional prosperity and the priorities of their financial supporters still had reasons to pay attention to them.

There are several changes in the region's exposure to the global economy after World War II that might have contributed to a decline in Southern support for internationalism. The role of cotton is especially important. As John Sharp Williams told Woodrow Wilson during World

[30] See, for example, Broz 2011; Fordham 1998; 2008.

[31] See, for example, Flynn and Fordham 2017; Trubowitz 1998, pp. 96-168.

War I, it was dangerous "to tell my constituents I can see something else besides cotton."[32] At that time, the commodity had long been the country's leading export as well as the central pillar of the Southern economy. It routinely comprised a quarter or more of the total value of U.S. annual exports during through 1914. After World War II, however, cotton became less export-dependent. Figure 2 shows the share of the annual cotton crop that was exported during the century after the Civil War. The dotted line shows a ten-year moving average to give a better sense of the long-term trends. The export share varied between 60 and 70 percent until World War I. It collapsed during the Great Depression and World War II and only recovered to around half of its pre-Depression level after 1945. Cotton remained an export crop, but less so than it had been before World War II.



Just as cotton was becoming less export-dependent, so its overall role in the Southern economy also declined. Figure 3 shows the size of the annual cotton crop from 1870 though 1970. Through World War I, the volume of cotton produced increased steadily. An optimistic

[32] Fry 2002, 152.

view of the future centered around cotton production would have been understandable in 1914. After the war, however, production leveled off. As late as eve of World War II, cotton producers and their political representatives might have held out hope that growth would resume. After all, the largest recorded crop was harvested in 1937. By the early postwar era, though, it had become clear that the old rate of growth in production was not coming back. Cotton remained important but it was not the expanding sector it had been before 1914. It was now politically safer to "see something else besides cotton."



While growth in cotton production ended after World War II, the United States still produced a great deal of this commodity. However, the geography of its production changed in ways that reduced its political importance in the South. The focus of production shifted to the West over time, reducing its economic role in much of the South. Figure 4 shows the regional trends.[33] The share of the crop grown in the South Atlantic region--mainly Georgia, Florida, and

[33] Figure 3 ends in 1963 because missing data for California, New Mexico, and Texas for 1964-73 distort comparisons for that period.

the Carolinas, dropped substantially after World War I, and declined further after World War II. Conversely, the share grown in the West and Mountain regions, especially New Mexico, Arizona, and California, grew enormously. During the 1950s, cotton production in these states overtook the East South Central region (Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky), which remained roughly stable. The West South Central region, which produced the largest share throughout the period, was also roughly stable over time. Cotton remained important in much of the South, but less so in Atlantic coastal states.

Figure 4.
Regional Share of Cotton Crop, 1900-1963



Cotton production also became more mechanized after World War II, employing fewer workers in all regions. Mechanical picking technology, which had been the main barrier to full mechanization before the war, greatly improved afterward. The percentage of the crop harvested by machines rose from 5 percent in 1950 to 50 percent by 1960, and to 90 percent by the end of the 1960s.[34] As Figure 5 suggests, this greatly reduced the demand for agricultural labor. The share of the workforce employed in agriculture in the South fell to roughly one quarter of its

[34] Wright 1986, 243. See also Fite 1980.

1930 level by 1960. The South had been distinctively agricultural compared to the rest of the country in 1930, but this regional characteristic disappeared almost entirely in the 25 years following the end of the war.



The declining importance of cotton exports undercut the economic basis of Southern support for multilateralism. Before World War I, the principal economic benefit for the South of multilateral cooperation with other developed countries was that these states imported large and growing amounts of the region's leading product. Cooperative relationships with them were vital. After World War II, it became increasingly clear not only that the upward trend in cotton production would not continue but also that this historically important commodity was now a diminishing source of wealth and employment in the region. The declining importance of cotton also undercut the political dominance of the internationalist agrarian elite that had long controlled Southern politics. (Perhaps fortunately for him, John Sharp Williams was not alive to witness this development, having died on his family plantation in Mississippi in 1932.) Support

for multilateralism by Southern members of Congress should be related to the importance of cotton in their home district. Its decline should contribute to their turn away from it.

The rise of import-sensitive manufacturing industries, especially textiles and apparel, parallels the declining importance of cotton exports. Textile manufacturing had been gradually increasing in the South since the late 19th Century, but it did not take off until the interwar period.[35] During the decade after World War II, U.S. textiles became acutely sensitive to foreign competition. The industry relied on a mature suite of technologies that was easily adopted by countries with relatively abundant low-wage labor. Concern about Japanese competition led the U.S. government to prevail upon Japan to accept "voluntary" export restraints beginning in the early 1950s, a concession that violated the multilateral rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[36] Charles Hero interviewed 28 Southern textile manufacturers between 1959 and 1961. Not surprisingly, they supported measures to protect their industry against Japanese competition. They also objected to U.S. participation in the GATT and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which was then formulating standards for development assistance.[37] These patterns suggest that the local importance of the textile industry might contribute to Southern politicians' growing opposition to multilateralism.

Some research on the politics of foreign policy in the South points to another, broader implication of economic change. The decline of agricultural employment not only reduced the salience of cotton but also heralded a sweeping social transformation. The region became far more urban than it had been before World War II. Writing in 1964, Charles Lerche argued that the rate of change itself helped fuel a backlash against the emerging national and international order. "The old society of the South is dissolving before the astonished eyes of the contemporary Southerner, and the new one that is taking shape is neither familiar nor pleasing to him."[38] Alfred Hero made a related argument, noting that social changes had reduced the power of the agrarian "paternalist segregationist" elite and enhanced that of less privileged (but equally bigoted) whites. This group fell prey to a "racist syndrome of international thought" that rejected not only multilateralism, particularly the UN, but also aid to developing countries, and any negotiations

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[35] Wright 1986, 129.

[36] Aggarwal 1985, 8-12.

[37] Hero 1965, 153-62. He found that apparel manufacturers were somewhat less vehement in their protectionism, though they generally aligned with the textile industry (162-4).

[38] Lerche 1964, 219; see also, Seabury 1957, 21-3; Fry 2002, 223-5.

with Communist powers, among other things.[39] These arguments suggest that the rate of economic and social change might also drive declining support for multilateralism.

This is a plausible line of argument about public opinion but it does not explain the shift among Southern members of Congress. Hero's review of public opinion surveys during this period indicates that opposition to multilateralism did not take hold in the general public in the South until the 1960s, well after members of Congress had changed. The evidence actually suggests that political leaders first changed their position, then influenced the general public, a process of elite leadership familiar from broader research on public opinion and on how party positions change.[40] This does not mean that the impact of social change on public opinion was politically unimportant. Once white Southerners came to associate the United Nations and other aspects of multilateralism with unwanted changes in their way of life, this line of thinking might have helped hold elite opposition to multilateralism in place even after the possibility of its use against Jim Crow was no longer important.

Individual-level considerations

Threats to white supremacy and changes in exposure to the global economy put pressure on members of Congress. However, not all of these politicians would have found it equally easy to embrace a change in their party's longstanding position on multilateralism. Some had reasons to resist. In assessing individual-level effects like these, it is critically important to consider the selection process that determined who represented a particular district in Congress. Whether or not a member who is predisposed to accept or reject the new position represents a district depends to some extent on their constituents' stake in that position. With this in mind, at least three individual-level effects are worth considering. Collectively, their impact on members' positions might reveal something about the propensity of individual politicians to resist economic and social trends in their constituency.

First, older members of Congress, who had been in politics for a long time, should have found adopting the new position especially difficult. They are more likely to have taken public positions before and during World War II that made a sudden conversion to unilateralism

[39] Hero 1965, 386-7, 396-404.

[40] On elite leadership, see for example, Zaller 1992, 13-22, 97-117. On how this works in changing party positions, see Carmines and Stimson 1989, esp. 159-83.

unconvincing. Walter George's involvement with the approval of the United Nations Charter in 1945 made his more unilateralist position in the mid-1950s less persuasive than that of his prospective primary opponent, former Georgia governor Herman Talmadge.[41] Similarly, Jamie Whitten, a new entrant into congressional politics, had an advantage over his incumbent opponent, Frank E. Smith, when he ran against him in the 1962 Democratic primary in Mississippi. Smith had the misfortune of having taken a range of now-unpopular positions on international commitments during the early postwar era.[42]

Second, during the 1950s, there was a broad national elite consensus on the need both for a more ambitious global role for the United States and for international cooperation in the face of the Soviet threat. Members of Congress had to confront not only the voters and interest groups in their district, but also the opinions of their peers and friends, whomever they might be. There was--and still is--a strong association between education and support for an activist foreign policy in the United States. Questioning the legitimacy of the United Nations or the need for international cooperation after World War II would have been a difficult position for members of Congress with a highly educated peer group to adopt. This may be why Hero found that the most educated and socially prestigious elements of Southern society--those he aptly labels the "racist cosmopolitans"--were the last to turn against multilateralism.[43]

Third, members with personal ties to agriculture should have found the older positions especially appealing. The landholding elite had a longstanding stake in multilateralist positions, including support for the UN and the League of Nations. Even as postwar changes eroded it, the agrarian elite still had an economic stake and a longstanding commitment to free access to the global economy. Multilateralism had long been the main means for promoting this access. Members with a direct stake in this pattern should be less like to turn against multilateralism.

Research Design

Table 1 summarizes the testable hypotheses implied by various explanations for the Southern turn away from multilateralism. This section sets out a research design for testing them.

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[41] Hero 1965, 8; Lerche 1964, 47.

[42] Hero 1965, 431.

[43] Hero 1965, 406-7.

Table 1.
Summary of Testable Hypotheses about Declining Southern Support for Multilateralism

The impact of racial hierarchy
H1. Support for multilateralism should be increasingly negatively associated with the African-American share of district population as the number of recently decolonized states joining the United Nations grows.
H2. Support for multilateralism should be increasingly negatively associated with the share of the district workforce engaged in agriculture as the number of recently decolonized states joining the United Nations grows.
The impact of exposure to the international economy
H3. Support for multilateralism should be positively associated with the per capita size of the cotton crop in the district.
H4. Support for multilateralism should be negatively associated with the share of employment in the textiles and apparel sectors in the district.
The impact of individual-level considerations
H5. Controlling for the characteristics of their constituency, older members should be more likely to support multilateralism.
H6. Controlling for the characteristics of their constituency, members with a college education should be more likely to support multilateralism.
H7. Controlling for the characteristics of their constituency, members who had previously worked in a profession linked to agriculture should be more likely to support multilateralism.

The hypotheses in Table 1 all concern Southern members of Congress. Many of the proposed causal processes, particularly those concerning racial hierarchy, were simply not relevant in other parts of the country. Racial hierarchy certainly existed outside the South but it worked differently, without a widespread system of voter suppression and labor-repressive agriculture. The precise definition of the South requires some attention. The most obvious way to handle this issue is to focus on the 11 states that seceded to form the Confederacy in 1860 and 1861. A somewhat more inclusive definition would add the "border states" that had slavery at the time of the Civil War but remained in the Union, or states designated by the Census as part of the South. The empirical analysis will include all 17 states that meet any of these criteria. All these states had statewide racial segregation to some extent after World War II, so members of Congress from them should experience some of the pressures associated with the changing role

of race in the international system.[44] As a robustness test, the hypotheses will also be tested on a sample restricted to the former Confederate states.

I will measure the dependent variable, support for multilateralism, using Congressional roll-call votes taken during the 79th through 87th Congresses, which met between 1945 and 1962. These include all measures concerning membership, participation, and financial support for multilateral organizations. The 29 votes to be considered are listed in Table 2. The list overlaps to some extent with that assembled by Charles Lerche, though his focus was on international cooperation rather than multilateralism. I thus omit the votes he included on immigration and foreign aid.[45] I identified these votes using data from the Voteview project.[46] I examined the context of each vote in the *Congressional Record* to determine whether a "yes" or "no" vote supported multilateralism on each one. In the analysis that follows, the unit of analysis is the individual vote on each roll call.

Table 2.
House Roll-Call votes on Multilateralism, 1945-62

Date	Vote Number	Description
30 April 1945	79th Congress, vote 31	Final passage of H.J. Res. 145, providing for U.S. membership in the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Passed, 291-25. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
9 May 1945	79th Congress, vote 34	Final passage of H.J. Res. 60, a proposed Constitutional amendment providing that treaties be ratified by a majority vote of the House and the Senate instead of a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Passed, 290-89. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
7 June 1945	79th Congress, vote 46	Motion to recommit H.R. 3314, providing for U.S. participation in the IMF and the World Bank. Rejected, 29-326. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
7 June 1945	79th Congress, vote 47	Final passage of H.R. 3314, providing for U.S. participation in the IMF and the World Bank. Passed, 349-20. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
1 November 1945	79th Congress, vote 91	Brown-Dirksen amendment to H.J. Res. 266. prohibiting the use of U.S. funds allocated to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in countries where the American press does not have unrestricted access. (Voteview lists this as the Canno amendment, but the Congressional Record indicates otherwise.) Passed, 206-187. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
1 November 1945	79th Congress, vote 92	Final passage of H.J. Res. 266 providing funds for U.S. participation in the activities of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Passed, 344-21. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.

[44] These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

[45] Lerche 1964, 100-1. Most of the foreign aid votes concerned bilateral programs, which Milner and Tingley (2013) found to have different sources of political support than multilateral aid does.

[46] Lewis, et al. 2021.

6 December 1945	79th Congress, vote 94	Final passage of H.R. 4649, providing for U.S. participation in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Passed, 327-39. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
18 December 1945	79th Congress, vote 100	Final passage of S.1580, providing for the appointment of U.S. representative to the United Nations and its agencies. Passed, 343-15. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
23 May 1946	79th Congress, vote 162	Final passage of H.J. Res. 305, providing for U.S. membership in United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Passed, 265-42. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
22 June 1950	81st Congress, vote 196	Final passage of H.J. Res. 334, amending certain laws to provide for U.S. membership in certain international organizations. Passed, 209-91. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
7 February 1951	82nd Congress, vote 7	Simpson amendment to H.R. 1612, extending the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements. Amendment inserted "peril point" provision to protect domestic producers. Passed, 225-168. A "no" vote supports multilateralism.
11 October 1951	82nd Congress, vote 99	Motion to recede and concur in Senate amendment no. 103, with an amendment related to U.S. contributions to international organizations. Passed, 238-164. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
18 October 1951	82nd Congress, vote 104	Final passage of S. Con. Res. 36, authorizing the appointment of 14 members of Congress to discuss common problems with representatives of the Council of Europe. Passed, 240-77. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
18 February 1955	84th Congress, vote 9	Reed motion to recommit H.R. 1, an extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, with instructions to amend the bill requiring the President to comply with the recommendations of the Tariff Commission. Rejected, 199-206. A "no" vote supports multilateralism.
18 March 1955	84th Congress, vote 15	Preston amendment to restore UN aid funds in H.R. 4903, Second Supplemental Appropriation for fiscal 1955. Adopted, 178-107. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
20 June 1955	84th Congress, vote 47	Motion to suspend rules and pass H. Con. Res. 109, authorizing a congressional delegation to attend the NATO Parliamentary Congress. Agreed to, 337-31. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
17 April 1957	85th Congress, vote 30	Amendment to H.R. 6871, Appropriation for State, Justice, and other departments, cutting funds for international organizations. Rejected, 181-220. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
8 August 1957	85th Congress, vote 70	Cole amendment to H.R. 8992, providing for U.S. participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Amendment deleted language requiring congressional approval for transfer of fissionable material to IAEA. Adopted, 298-100. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
11 June 1958	85th Congress, vote 140	Motion to recommit H.R. 12591, providing a five-year extension of the President's authority to enter into trade agreements, without instructions. Rejected, 146-268. A "no" vote supports multilateralism.
25 March 1959	86th Congress, vote 13	Final passage of H.R. 4452, increasing U.S. subscriptions to the IMF and the World Bank. Passed, 316-57. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
27 July 1959	86th Congress, vote 55	Final passage of H.R. 7072, providing for U.S. participation in the Inter-American Development Bank. Passed 240-91. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
24 June 1960	86th Congress, vote 156	Final passage of H.J. Res. 649, the International Health and Medical Research Act. Passed 277-123. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
29 June 1960	86th Congress, vote 159	Final passage of H.R. 11001, providing for U.S. participation in the International Development Association. Passed 251-160. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.

24 August 1960	86th Congress, vote 177	Final passage of S.J. Res. 170 authorizing the President to appoint private citizens to an international commission on the NATO alliance to promote greater cooperation. Passed, 294-109. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
19 June 1961	87th Congress, vote 43	Final passage of Fourth Supplemental Appropriation for Fiscal 1961 covers U.S. share of UN mission in the Congo. Passed, 294-64. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
2 April 1962	87th Congress, vote 138	Final passage of H.R. 7712, providing standby authority for the U.S. to lend $2 billion to the International Monetary Fund. Passed, 258-94. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
4 April 1962	87th Congress, vote 141	Gross motion to recommit H.R. 11038, Second Supplemental Appropriations bill with instructions to limit the U.S. contribution to the UN mission in the Congo. Rejected, 156-238. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
14 September 1962	87th Congress, vote 199	Motion to recommit S.2762, authorizing the president to match up to $100 million in UN bond purchases by other member states. Rejected, 181-229. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
14 September 1962	87th Congress, vote 200	Final passage of S.2762, authorizing the president to match up to $100 million in UN bond purchases by other member states. Passed, 267-144. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.

The 29 votes reflect the decline in Southern support for multilateralism that other observers have noted. Figure 6 depicts the difference between the proportion of Southern members supporting multilateralism that of members from the rest of the country on each roll call. Through the 84th Congress, which met in 1955 and 1956, Southern members were nearly always more supportive of multilateralism than those from the rest of the country. Beginning with the 85 Congress, this pattern was reversed, with Southerners nearly always less supportive of multilateralism.



The votes listed in Table 2 were all taken in the House of Representatives. In principle, the Senate might be a more obvious body in which to evaluate arguments about foreign policy given its greater Constitutional authority in this issue area. The debates quoted at the beginning of this paper both took place in the Senate. Unfortunately, the number of Southern Senators is not large enough to provide much analytical leverage. At most 34 Southern Senators could participate in a roll-call, whereas between 99 and 140 Southern House members voted in the roll calls listed in Table 2. Moreover, data on House districts are more fine-grained than those on states, which often elide substantial local differences. The House may have a smaller institutional role on foreign policy issues than the Senate does, but foreign policy issues nevertheless arise there. When they do, House members are subject to the same political pressures as Senators are.[47]

The analysis requires data on several characteristics of each House member's constituency. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1964 ruling in Wesberry v. Sanders that congressional

[47] Data on individual members are from ICPSR and McKibben 1997.

districts had to be very nearly equal in population, congressional districts in most of the country, including nearly all of the South, followed county borders.[48] These district boundaries were revised only irregularly. For instance, those established in Louisiana in 1912 were not revised until 1966.[49] This institutional setup, while far from democratic, makes it possible to aggregate county-level data into congressional districts for the period considered here.

The U.S. decennial censuses from 1940, 1950, and 1960 provide county-level data on the race of the population, the size of the workforce, and employment in agriculture and manufacturing industries, including textiles and apparel.[50] The Census of Agriculture provides

[48] In a few cases, urban counties or cities were divided into multiple districts, sometimes with the addition of one or more of the surrounding counties. In these cases, I divided the population of the city or urban county evenly among the districts. The cases where this happened are as follows:

1. Orleans Parish, Louisiana, is divided between the 1st and 2nd congressional districts for the 63rd through the 90th Congresses.
2. Baltimore City, Maryland, is divided among the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th congressional districts for the 68th through the 82nd Congresses, and among the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th congressional districts for the 83rd through 87th Congresses.
3. City of St. Louis, Missouri, is divided among the 11th, 12th, and 13th districts for the 74th through the 82nd Congresses, and among the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd districts for the 83rd through 87th Congresses.
4. Jackson County, Missouri, which contains most of Kansas City, is divided between districts 4 and 5 for the 74th through the 87th Congresses.
5. Harris County, Texas, which contains Houston, was split between districts 8 and 22 during the 86th and 87th Congresses.

In addition to these divided counties, a few states had at-large representatives elected on a statewide basis for certain periods of time. Texas had one at-large representative for the 83rd through the 85th Congresses, in addition to those allocated to specific districts within the state. Alabama elected all eight of its representatives at large during the 88th Congress.

Virginia has separate statistics for independent cities but not all were incorporated as such throughout the period considered here. Three cities became independent of their former counties in 1948: Colonial Heights from Chesterfield County, Falls Church from Fairfax County, and Waynesboro from Augusta County. Virginia created several new independent cities between the 1950 and 1960 censuses. They remained in the congressional district for the county in which they were located. The city of Covington was created in Allegheny County. The city of Galax was created out of Carroll and Grayson counties in 1953. (Both counties were in the same congressional district.) The city of Norton was created out of Wise County. South Boston was created in Halifax County in 1960. Virginia Beach was created out of Princess Anne County in 1952. In 1963, the remainder of Princess Anne County was merged into the City of Virginia Beach. In the same year, the City of Chesapeake was created through a merger of Norfolk County and the city of South Norfolk. For present purposes, these changes nominally affect only the 1964 Census of Agriculture, though neither city actually produced any cotton in 1964.

There were several other changes to cities and counties in Virginia in 1952. Elizabeth City County was merged into the cities of Hampton and Newport News in that year, and so is not included in the 1960 Census of Population or the agricultural censuses after 1950, though it was mentioned in the 1952 law setting Congressional district boundaries. Similarly, Warwick County became the city of Warwick in 1952 and was consolidated into the city of Newport News in 1958 while remaining in the same Congressional district.

[49] Martis 1982 lists the counties included in each congressional district for all states for the period considered here, the 79th through 87th Congresses.

[50] These data appear in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1943; 1952; 1963.

county-level data on the cotton crop at roughly 5-year intervals.[51] After computing population counts and agricultural production for each district, I computed cotton production in bales per capita, the percentage of employed persons in agriculture and the textile and apparel sectors, and the percentage of the population who were black for 1940, 1950, and 1960. The value of these variables used for each congress is a linear interpolation of the value for the year in which that congress was elected.

Finally, the hypotheses concerning the impact of white supremacy imply an interaction between domestic conditions and the changing international environment. The African-American population of a member's district did not provide a political motive for opposing multilateralism until its implications for racial hierarchy changed.[52] The number of recently independent former European colonies that had joined the United Nations, discussed earlier and depicted in Figure 1, provides the primary indicator of international conditions used in the empirical analysis that follows. The number of these new states in each year (plus one) will be logged to account for the diminishing marginal effect of additional former colonies joining the UN over time. The performance of models using this trend will be assessed against alternatives using simple break points in 1950 and 1954, which have also been suggested in previous research, the unlogged number of recently decolonized UN members, and a simple linear time trend.

Empirical Analysis

Table 3 presents the results of four models of individual votes supporting multilateralism on the 29 roll-calls listed in Table 2. The first includes only variables testing the hypotheses on racial hierarchy. The second includes only those concerning the impact of exposure to the international economy. The third combines these two sets of variables. The fourth adds four additional variables testing the individual-level hypotheses.

[51] These data are from U.S. Department of Agriculture 2022.

[52] If the African-American population had an unmediated negative effect on support for multilateralism, then the fact that John Sharp Williams' home county in Mississippi, Yazoo, was nearly 72% black in 1920 might have dampened his enthusiasm for the League of Nations (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1922).

Table 3.
Logit Models of Southern Support for Multilateralism on House Roll-Call Votes, 1945-62

	1. Racial hierarchy	2. Exposure to international economy	3. Combined model	4. Individual-level considerations
African-American population (percentage of district population)	0.03* (0.01)		0.04* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)
Agricultural employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.01 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	-0.24 (0.14)		-0.24 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.14)
African-American population * Logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	-0.02* (0.004)		-0.02* (0.004)	-0.02* (0.005)
Interaction term: Agricultural employment * Logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	0.0002 (0.004)		-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Cotton production (500-pound bales per capita)		0.24 (0.18)	0.58* (0.25)	0.59* (0.25)
Textile and apparel employment (percentage of employed persons in district)		-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Member age				0.01 (0.01)
Member attended college				-0.15 (0.40)
Member's profession linked to agriculture				-0.17 (0.41)
Constant	1.93* (0.41)	1.14* (0.12)	2.15* (0.44)	2.00* (0.74)
n	3,555	3,555	3,555	3,555
BIC	3744.20	4059.73	3697.98	3719.04

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual member reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$

Overall, the results in Table 3 support some but not all of the hypotheses associated with the arguments concerning racial hierarchy and changing exposure to the international economy. The effects of racial hierarchy appear to be somewhat stronger than those of exposure to the international economy, though both make a difference. The table reports the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistic, a commonly used comparison statistic for non-nested

models. Lower scores indicate better fit.[53] Model 1, which includes only the independent variables associated with the effect of racial hierarchy, fits the data much better than model 2, which includes only the economic variables. However, model 3, which combines both sets of variables, performs better still. Its superior performance is also reflected in the larger coefficients for both the African-American population and cotton production, which are positively correlated but have opposite effects. The combined model will be used to evaluate the magnitude of the relationships hypothesized here, and as a baseline for comparison against alternative specifications in the remainder of this analysis. The addition of the individual-level variables does not improve the overall performance of the model and none of these variables is statistically significant.

Turning first to the hypotheses about racial hierarchy, the results offer support for hypothesis 1, on the changing impact of the African-American population of the district, but not for hypothesis 2, concerning the agricultural workforce. The relationship between the racial makeup of the district and the probability of voting in support of multilateralism is both substantively large and highly dependent on changes in the international environment. Figure 7 shows this relationship at three points in time. First, in 1950-54, when 5 recently decolonized states had joined the UN, the racial composition of the district had essentially no effect on support for multilateralism. In 1958, on the other hand, when there were 17 recently decolonized states in the UN, members from districts with larger African-American populations were substantially less likely to support multilateralism. This relationship is stronger still in 1962, when 43 recently decolonized states had joined the UN.

[53] Long (1997, 110-2) notes that differences in the BIC score of less than 2 provide weak support for the lower-scoring model, differences between 2 and 6 provide positive support, differences between 6 and 10 provide strong support, and differences greater than 10 provide very strong support. See also Clarke 2001.



Because the interactive relationship between the racial composition of the district and the number of recently decolonized states in the UN is so important, it merits additional scrutiny. Table 4 presents model comparison statistics to assess whether alternative ways of handling this relationship perform better. The first two alternative models entirely omit first the interaction terms, and then also the logged number of recently decolonized states in the UN. Both perform quite poorly compared to the combined model. Southern members' response to the racial composition of their district certainly appears to have changed over time. The remaining alternative models consider different ways to capture this change. As Figure 6 suggests, the change appears to have happened relatively quickly. This raises the question of whether the shift is better described by a discrete break point, as many authors have suggested, rather than a trend. As noted earlier, the main candidates for the break point are 1950, when the debate over the Genocide Convention clarified the implications of multilateralism for racial hierarchy, and 1954, when the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision raised the salience of the threat to Jim

Crow. It is also possible that a simple linear time trend or the unlogged number of decolonized states in the UN would work better.

Table 4.
BIC statistics for Alternative Models

Model	BIC statistic
Combined model from Table 3 (baseline)	3697.98
Interaction terms excluded	3744.22
Logged number of recently decolonized states in UN and interaction term excluded	4045.83
Break point in 1950 substituted for logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	3795.65
Break point in 1954 substituted for logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	3764.68
Number of recently decolonized states in UN not logged	3786.20
Linear time trend substituted for logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	3695.14

Note: Alternative models are identical to the combined model from Table 3 except as noted. The estimation sample is the same size for all of them (n=3,555).

The statistics in Table 4 strongly support the main model over those positing a discrete break point in 1950 or 1954. Indeed, models with no interaction term and no time trend fit better than these two. The combined model from Table 3 is strongly supported over all these alternatives. However, the model employing a linear time trend performs slightly better. This result must temper any conclusions about exactly when Southern members of Congress turned against multilateralism or the precise drivers of the change. The political environment was more complicated than the number of newly decolonized states, considered alone, suggests. It is safe to say that the change in the foreign policy implications of district racial composition did not occur at a discrete point in time, but rather more gradually over the course of the period considered here. However, we cannot draw strong conclusions about the precise drivers of the change based on the empirical evidence reviewed here.

Given the role of racial hierarchy in labor-repressive agriculture in the South, why is there so little evidence that agricultural employment in the district made a difference? One possibility is that the increasing mechanization of agriculture, and the concomitant decline in the need for agricultural labor after World War II, made this consideration less important than it might have been at an earlier point in time. Southern landowners may have worried about the threat that multilateralism posed to Jim Crow but probably not because it threatened their

economic interests. If the League of Nations had undertaken actions on racial equality like those of the UN during the interwar period when agricultural mechanization was far less advanced, things might have been different.

Turning to the effect of exposure to the international economy, both hypothesis 3, on the impact of the cotton crop, and hypothesis 4, about the textile and apparel industries, find support. The per capita size of the cotton crop is statistically significant only in models 3 and 4, which include a variable controlling for the racial composition of the district and the share of the workforce in agriculture. Cotton production is positively correlated with both these variables, which have negative effects on support for multilateralism. Controlling for them is probably necessary to discern the positive effect of cotton production. Figure 8 depicts the size of this effect in 1950-54 and in 1962, before and after the regional shift against from multilateralism got underway. Although the maximum observed value of cotton production per capita was greater than the maximum value depicted in Figure 8, values greater than 2 occurred in only a few unusual cases. The effects of cotton production in the latter period are substantively larger, mainly because few dissented from the multilateralist consensus in the early period. Members from heavily cotton-producing districts were less likely to go along with the emerging new position later on. This effect is substantial but smaller than the impact of the racial composition of the district by 1962.



While cotton acted as a brake on the regional turn against multilateralism, the textile and apparel industries accelerated it. Figure 9 depicts the effect of employment in these industries in their district on members' support for multilateralism in 1950 and 1962. Textile and apparel manufacturing was more geographically concentrated than cotton production. It accounted for more than 5% of total employment in on 23.5% of the cases in the sample, and more than 10% in only 12.5%. Values of greater than 30% were rare. Unlike cotton production, district employment in textiles and apparel has substantial effects in both the early and the later period. The results suggest that the protectionism of these industries might have helped produce early dissenters from the multilateralist consensus of the immediate postwar period in the districts where it was most heavily concentrated. As with cotton production, this relationship is substantively important but not as large as that associated with the racial composition of the district toward the end of the period considered here.[54]

[54] This effect was specific to these industries and does not appear to proxy the manufacturing sector as a whole. If overall manufacturing employment is substituted for employment in textiles and apparel, it is negative and



The final set of hypotheses concerns the individual-level characteristics of the members of Congress themselves. The results do not support any of them. It is tempting to conclude that broader social pressures drove the change in the Southern position, something that is indeed consistent with the breadth and speed of the change. This conclusion should not be treated with great caution, however. For one thing, the individual-level characteristics considered here are quite limited.[55] Many other things might have made a difference. Moreover, the purely idiosyncratic character of the individuals involved no doubt mattered in particular cases in ways that statistical analysis does not reveal.

statistically significant, but does not fit the data as well. It produces a BIC statistic of 3722.55, roughly 25 points higher than the model using textile and apparel employment instead.

[55] There may be some measurement error as well. The data from ICSPR and McKibbin (1996) code the most recent profession held before entering Congress. By this reckoning, only a small number of Southern members have a connection to agriculture. A deeper examination of their background might turn up more members with such a connection. Moreover, other professions might have an indirect but still important connection to agriculture not captured in the data.

Table 5 presents several additional robustness tests of the main model considered here. For the sake of convenience, the results of this model, which is also model 3 in Table 3, are repeated in this table. Model 2 uses the same independent variables on a sample restricted to the 11 former Confederate states instead of the expanded definition of the South used thus far. The results are arguably somewhat stronger in this smaller sample. The same time-dependent relationship between the racial composition of the district and support for multilateralism emerges, though these results imply no period when the relationship between the African American share of the population and support for multilateralism is positive. There is a negative relationship between agricultural employment and support for multilateralism, a result consistent with hypothesis 2 but not evident in the larger sample. The results concerning exposure to the international economy are essentially unchanged.

Table 5.
Logit Models of Southern Support for Multilateralism on House Roll-Call Votes, 1945-62

	Combined model from Table 3 (baseline)	Sample restricted to former Confederacy	Votes on UN excluded	Votes on trade excluded
African-American population (percentage of district population)	0.04* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.08* (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)
Agricultural employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	-0.24 (0.14)	-0.78* (0.14)	0.09 (0.16)	-0.31 (0.16)
African-American population * Logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	-0.02* (0.004)	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.005)
Interaction term: Agricultural employment * Logged number of recently decolonized states in UN	-0.002 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00004 (0.004)
Cotton production (500-pound bales per capita)	0.58* (0.25)	0.59* (0.28)	0.59* (0.25)	0.61* (0.27)
Textile and apparel employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Constant	2.15* (0.44)	3.58* (0.48)	1.20* (0.44)	2.53* (0.50)
n	3,555	2,534	2,106	3,555

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual member reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$

The last two models in Table 5 test whether the specific set of roll-calls that comprise the dependent variable makes a difference. One possibility is that Southern opposition to multilateralism was principally confined to the United Nations, which certainly became a special target for abuse from opponents of multilateralism in later years. The third model drops the votes that directly concern the UN or its subsidiary bodies. Though this sample contains a smaller number of observations, the results are substantively unchanged. Similarly, one might suspect that the variables indicating exposure to the international economy are significant only because of the inclusion of votes about international trade. Perhaps these considerations make no difference on non-economic aspects of multilateralism. In fact, the results are essentially the same when the trade votes are excluded. Both these models suggest that sentiments about

multilateralism tended to hold across specific institutions and issue areas. As noted earlier, there is a tendency for the U.S. domestic opponents of multilateralism to reject the entire institutional form and turn instead to a foreign policy based on the unilateral application of American power. This appears to have been the case with Southern members of Congress during the period considered here.

Conclusion

Racial hierarchy has a central but not exclusive role in the picture of the Southern turn against multilateralism that emerges from the evidence considered here. Members responded to the racial composition of their district very differently by the end of the 1950s than they did at the beginning of the decade. Once this pattern emerged, it was substantively more important than the others relationships considered here. The evidence is consistent with the argument that changes in the implications of multilateralism for Southern racial hierarchy motivated the increasing response to district racial composition but is not entirely conclusive on this point. Other aspects of the domestic and international environment during the 1950s might also have contributed to the emergence of this pattern.

Racial hierarchy was not the only thing that influenced Southern elite positions on multilateralism. Exposure to the international economy also played a role. Where it remained important, cotton production acted as a brake on the shift against multilateralism. Its declining role in the economy, particularly in the South Atlantic region, removed an important underpinning from the old multilateralist consensus. The protectionist textile and apparel industries also made a difference, having a substantial effect even during the early years after 1945, when the impact of racial hierarchy had not yet made itself felt. Employment in these industries among their constituents may have helped motivate early dissenters against multilateralism.

In understanding the emergence and spread of Southern opposition to multilateralism it is not enough to note that Southern elites supported white supremacy and turned against multilateral institutions when they threatened this ideological priority. This observation may be true in broad strokes but is too simple in at least two respects. First, prior Southern support for multilateralism was genuine and did not immediately disappear after the debate over the Genocide Convention in 1949 and 1950. It competed with their concerns about racial hierarchy.

Some of their constituents had long expected real benefits from multilateral cooperation, and their interests made a difference. Members representing cotton-producing regions persisted in their support of at least some aspects of multilateralism into the 1960s. Second, the specific political implications of white supremacy were not the same for all Southern members of Congress. Nearly all participated in the defense of Jim Crow, but some were more likely than others to lose their seats if African Americans in their district were able to vote. These members were much more likely to turn against multilateralism than their colleagues who faced a less serious electoral threat. Even then, this effect did not become truly pervasive until the late 1950s, when a substantial number of recently decolonized states committed to ending white supremacy worldwide had entered the UN.

In these respects, the impact of racial hierarchy on Southern opposition to multilateralism works much like other processes commonly considered in political economy models of the politics of foreign policy. These models seek to explain the positions of political actors in terms of the differential impact of exposure to the international economy on them and their constituents. Like exposure to the international economy, racial hierarchy, considered as a set of institutions and practices rather than an ideological conviction, had a differential impact on Southern members of Congress. Their ideological position on race was essentially homogenous: they were white supremacists. If personal ideology had shaped this process, then all would have turned against multilateralism at the same time. The results here suggest that, in this context and perhaps in others, it may be more useful to attend to the systemic aspects of racial hierarchy than to these individual attitudes.

One final question that is beyond the scope of this paper nevertheless deserves a brief comment: why did Southern opposition to multilateralism persist even after the Jim Crow system had been largely dismantled? By the 1970s, Congress and the Supreme Court had effectively ended nearly all aspects of legal segregation, so continuing concern about the use of multilateral rules against it arguably made little sense. One possible explanation concerns the growing alliance between Southern conservatives and those in the Republican Party. Conservative Republicans had opposed multilateralism for far longer than Southerners had and for much broader reasons. Opposition to UN human rights agreements and other foreign policy issues formed an early ideological bridge between these new allies and appears to have become embedded in conservative ideology across the board. Among other things, preventing acceptance

of multilateral rules that could be binding in domestic law preserved the political space for socially conservative goals that might otherwise have been ruled out. A broader backlash against rapid social change--the one that produced Hero's "racist syndrome of international thought"--might well have reinforced this ideological position after the 1960s.[56]

Whatever the explanation, Southern opposition to multilateralism has persisted. This fact has had enormous consequences in recent years. Without the support of white Southerners, both in Congress and in the general public, the two most recent Republican presidents would never have been elected, let alone have attacked multilateral institutions as aggressively as they did.

[56] Hero 1965, 396-404.

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