

## Supporting Information for Online Publication

This appendix provides additional information about our data on Congressional speeches, examines the relationship between party and economic structure, and present several robustness checks of our results, for which we did not have enough space in the paper.

### 1. The Speech Data

As we noted in the paper, our data included negative and positive evaluations of both specific countries and of the international environment more generally. A few typical examples help illustrate each type of statements included in our data. On February 15, 1907, Representative John Weeks (R-MA) offered a negative evaluation of Japan, The statement in question was as follows:

I am not for one moment considering the merits or demerits of this live question whether we should or should not limit Japanese labor; but if we are not going to do it, if we are not going to treat the Japanese as we treat the Hun and the Pole, and, in fact, every other people of Europe, then we may expect that Japan will resent it. They may not resent it with force now, but it is our duty to assume that they will later, and to prepare for just that possibility.<sup>1</sup>

By contrast, on March 26, 1910, Representative Isaac Sherwood (D-OH) gave the following positive evaluation of the same country:

The spectacular jingoes are saying we must always be prepared for war, and they seem to see a menace to peace in war-worn and war-tired Japan. This imaginary menace has literally been worked to death. No intelligent American citizen who understands the aims and mission of Japan has any fear of war. Even if Japan so desired, she would be utterly unable to conduct a war with the United States.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, on February 15, 1907, Representative Theodore Burton (R-OH) gave the following positive evaluation of the international environment, generally:

---

<sup>1</sup> John Weeks' statement made during House Naval Appropriations Debate, *The Congressional Record*, Vol. 41., 59th Cong., 2d sess., 1907, p. 3949.

<sup>2</sup> Isaac Sherwood's statement made during House Naval Appropriations Debate, *The Congressional Record*, Vol. 45, 61st Cong., 1s sess., 1910, p. 3837.

We have the respect of other nations. They look with admiration upon our growth, surprising in its increase of power and prosperity beyond all that is recorded in the history of progress. They depend upon us for supplies and many things essential both for peace and war. No nation on the globe is threatening us; no nation on the globe will think lightly of engaging in war with us.<sup>3</sup>

In response to Representative Burton's remarks, Representative Adolph Meyer (D-LA) provided his own negative evaluation of the international environment:

Unless human nature changes from all its tendencies during the ages, we can not [sic] expect to realize [Mr. Burton's] ideals in the years to come. We may dream of universal peace—we may repose calmly in the beatific hope that the millennium has been reached—and that all the people of the earth have "beaten their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks," but our awakening will tell us that wars on our continent and with other nations have not ceased to exist.<sup>4</sup>

The Tables and figures that follow provide additional information about the speech data, as well as descriptive statistics on all the data we used in the paper.


---

<sup>3</sup> Theodore Burton's statement made during House Naval Appropriations Debate, *The Congressional Record*, Vol. 41, 59th Cong., 2d sess., 1907, p. 3048.


<sup>4</sup> Adolph Meyer's statement made during House Naval Appropriations Debate, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 41, 59th Cong., 2d sess., 1907, p. 3055.

**Table A1.**  
**Summary Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs.</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Negative Evaluations	5846	0.023	0.165	0	4
Positive Evaluations	5846	0.026	0.183	0	4
Republican	5846	0.514	0.500	0	1
Manufacturing %	5846	0.213	0.117	0	1
Attended College	5846	0.684	0.465	0	1
Officer	5846	0.174	0.379	0	1
Coastal State	5846	0.455	0.498	0	1
Senate	5846	0.198	0.398	0	1
Size of Congressional Delegation	5846	16.638	10.633	2	47




**Figure A1 – Total number of evaluations given by congress.**




**Figure A2 - Frequency of positive and negative evaluations by congress.**

### Frequency Distribution of State Evaluations per Congress




**Figure A3 – Frequency distribution of positive and negative evaluations of specific states.**

### Frequency Distribution of Legislator Evaluations



**Figure A4 - Frequency distribution of legislator evaluations (non-zero values only)**



**Figure A5 - Total number of evaluations for frequently targeted states by congress.**



## **2. Manufacturing Sector Size vs. Import-Penetration and Export-Orientation**

Many analyses of the politics of foreign policy during the post-World War II era use measures of import-penetration and export-orientation to represent constituent interests in trade and trade protection (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Fordham 1998; 2008). One could measure import-penetration (or import-sensitivity) using the imports divided by domestic production of the imported commodity. Similarly, one could measure export-orientation using exports of a particular good as a share of total domestic production. While highly useful in the post-World War II era, these measure provide misleading representations of trade interests before World War I. In this section, we will examine these data more closely to explain why. We will begin with import-penetration, then consider the problems of export-orientation.

***Import-penetration.*** The difficulty with import-penetration measures used in research on the postwar period is that the high tariffs prevailing before 1914 render them a poor measure of actual vulnerability to imports in highly protected sectors. Figure A6 shows the overall nominal level of tariff protection in the United States between 1820 and 2000. As the discussion in the paper explains, tariff rates were substantially higher between 1890 and 1914 than they have been since World War II. Indeed, rates of protection during this period were even greater than in the nominal data. The same manufacturers who secured high tariffs on imports of their finished products also sought lower duties on inputs, raising their effective rate of protection. Hawke (1975, 91-2) shows that the effective rate of protection exceeded 100 percent in some major manufacturing sectors, such as leather goods, cotton goods, and tobacco products.

Figure A7 helps illustrate the extent to which import-penetration scores are misleading indicators of vulnerability to import competition during this period. It shows imports as a share of domestic production for a range of raw mineral products, manufactures, and agricultural


products. Table A2, from Hawke (1975, 90) shows the effective rate of protection for the 20 most protected industries in 1904. Some of the most heavily protected sectors have quite low import-penetration scores, such as leather products (including leather gloves and mittens and leather: tanned, curried, and finished), wool products, cotton goods, and tobacco products. All of these sectors had effective protection rates in excess of 100 percent, a fact that surely contributed to the apparently low rate of import competition. The sectors with the highest rates of import-penetration were those with little domestic production, including wines and sugar. The miscellaneous manufactures category, which included a range of products not produced in sufficient quantity to be listed separately, is another example. Overall, the import-penetration numbers in Figure A7 reflect trade protection as much as sensitivity to foreign imports. In the postwar era, with much lower rates of protection, this is a much smaller problem.

***Export-orientation.*** Assessing export-orientation using exports as a percentage of total production is also problematic for our purposes, though for somewhat different reasons. Our argument hinges in part on the preference of manufacturers and agriculturalists for trade with less-developed and developed markets, respectively. Agriculturalists' preference for trade with developed states is simple enough: these were their best markets. As we explain in the paper, the same was not true for manufacturers. Their interest in less developed markets in Asia and Latin America stemmed from their expectations about the future rather than current trading relations. They expected increasing European protectionism--a response, in part, to continuously high American tariffs--to diminish the value of developed markets. They hoped that less-developed markets could compensate for this trend.

The patterns of export orientation by sector reflect ongoing trade rather than the expectations about the future evident among manufacturers and their political representatives.


Figure A8 displays export orientation scores for various manufacturing and agricultural sectors. As the statistics on aggregate trade presented in the paper would lead one to expect, Europe was a better trading partner for nearly all manufacturers.

Figure A6.  
Nominal United States Tariff Levels, 1820-2000



Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Millenium Edition, Series Ee429-430

**Figure A7. Import Penetration in 1890 and 1900**




**Table A2.**  
**Effective Rates of Protection in 1904 for 20 Most Protected Sectors**

	Effective rate of protection	Nominal tariff
1. Tin and terne plate	556	55
2. Leather gloves and mittens	276	54
3. Zinc smelting	256	29
4. Wool manufactures	255	90
5. Silk manufactures	242	48
6. Cotton goods	238	37
7. Tobacco	223	151
8. Butter, cheese, and condensed milk	205	28
9. Hosiery and knit goods	154	65
10. Glass	116	60
11. Carpets	109	65
12. Leather: tanned, curried, and finished	108	20
13. Blackplate	104	48
14. Steel works and rolling mills	88	56
15. Carriages and wagons	74	45
16. Salt	70	41
17. Chemicals and allied products	69	23
18. Electrical machinery	63	45
19. Bicycles and tricycles	62	45
20. Coke	61	20

Note: This table is taken from Table 1 in Hawke (1975, 90). The numbers indicate percentage additions to free trade levels.

**Figure A8. Sectoral Export Orientation by Region**



### **3. Selection and Influence in the Effect of Party**

One potential problem with comparison of the effects of party affiliation with that of economic interests is that that party might embody some of the effects of these societal interests. In their analysis of roll-call voting on trade policy, Fordham and McKeown (2003) distinguish between a "selection" and an "influence" effect of constituent interests. Selection refers to influences on candidate recruitment, nomination, and election. Influence refers to efforts to affect the votes of sitting legislators. If their impact on the selection process is sufficiently large, constituents might have no need to lobby sitting legislators. Making a parallel case using the language of principal-agent theory, Bearce (2003) argues that societal interests, acting as principals, select representatives to serve as their agents based on the ideological commitments that their party affiliation implies. The societal constituents need only lobby if their representative shirks by taking positions that run against these ideological commitments. However one frames the argument, it suggests that at least some of the effect of constituent interests on legislators' views of the international environment should work through the election of ideologically sympathetic candidates rather than changes in the positions of those already holding office.

Some of the analysis in the paper rests on the assumption that the selection effect of economic interests is not so strong that it is unreasonable to include party alongside economic interests in predicting members' positions on international conditions. If the selection process worked perfectly, economic actors might have no need to influence their representatives by directly lobbying them once they were in office. During the 1890–1914 period, party affiliation was a very good indicator of the positions a member of Congress would take on many issues. As we noted in the paper, Republican affiliation almost perfectly predicted support for high tariffs.



While selection is potentially important, we suspect that influence should also make a difference. Though the Republican Party was closely associated with manufacturing interests, Republicans also represented some predominantly agricultural areas of the country. Similarly, some Democrats were elected in areas where manufacturing predominated. This fact gives societal economic interests ample reason to persuade their representative to move away from the party's typical foreign policy position in many cases.

To assess the influence of the selection process we will examine the influence of the size of the manufacturing sector--our indicator of economic interests--on the probability of a Republican electoral victory between 1890 and 1912.<sup>5</sup> The Democratic Party dominated the heavily agrarian South during this period as a legacy of the Civil War. To avoid the possibility that this pattern will produce spurious support for our argument that manufacturing areas favored Republicans, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the state was a former member of the Confederacy. Finally, we also include fixed effects for each individual congress to control for the shifting electoral fortunes of the two parties over time.

The results presented in Table A3 show that the size of the manufacturing sector is positively related to the probability of a Republican electoral victory. This relationship holds even though we control for Democratic dominance in the South. However, this magnitude of this relationship is not overwhelming. For example, when looking at a non-Southern district in the 56<sup>th</sup> Congress, increasing the manufacturing variable from the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile (i.e. from .13 to .31) increases the predicted probability of a Republican representative by 5 percentage points, from .65 to .70. Increasing the manufacturing score from the 25<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Unit of observation is the legislator-election year. Note that we only included legislators who were elected through a general election, or in some cases a special election. Legislators appointed by governors, for example, were excluded. Because we consider only elections through 1912, our results concern almost exclusively the House. Very few senators were popularly elected before the ratification of 17<sup>th</sup> amendment.

percentile (.13) to .50, the approximate maximum that we observe in the data, increases the predicted probability of a Republican victory from .65 to .75. These results suggest that party is unlikely to embody the entire effect of economic structure on members' foreign policy outlooks. Selection mattered, but there is plenty of room for influence effects of the sort we consider in the main text of the paper.

**Table A3.**  
Probit Model Predicting Election of Republican  
Representative

Manufacturing	0.724*** (0.230)
South	-1.982*** (0.0788)
Constant	-0.554*** (0.104)
Observations	4695

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for individual congresses not shown.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

#### 4. Robustness Checks

We have also run a series of alternative models to assess the robustness of our findings. These checks can be found in Tables A4 through A5, shown below.

Before the ratification of the 17<sup>th</sup> amendment in 1913, most Senators were not elected by popular vote. This fact might have affected their relationship with their constituents, and have run several robustness checks to consider it. The findings in the paper are generally supported by these tests. Including a dummy variable for the Senate does not alter our results in any way.

Splitting the sample between the House and the Senate does yield some minor changes in the Senate models. As we show in Table A4, when predicting favorable evaluations the Republican Party variable remains highly significant and negative, but manufacturing is not significant. Having attended college also appears to be negative and significantly correlated with the number of positive evaluations given by a Senator. When predicting negative evaluations manufacturing remains positive and highly significant in the Senate models. The Republican and college variables all fail to attain statistical significance in the negative models. In sum, our variable of primary theoretical interest—manufacturing orientation—only fails to perform as expected when examining positive evaluations in the Senate. Results from the House models are consistent with the pooled models.

We include an additional set of models in Table A5 that test the influence of legislators' ideology, rather than party, on threat assessments. As we discuss in the paper, partisanship and ideology might function as intervening variables. Though we focus on partisanship in the main paper, we ran several robustness checks using ideology as well. To measure ideology, we use the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE Common Space scores.<sup>6</sup> First, the manufacturing

---

<sup>6</sup> Sources for this data include: Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 2007. *Ideology and Congress*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Press., and Carroll, Royce, Jeffrey B. Lewis, James Lo, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal.

variable performs as we expect. The only minor difference that emerges is that manufacturing is no longer negatively correlated with positive evaluations in Model 2. Ideology does not appear to be correlated with negative evaluations, but is consistently negatively correlated with positive evaluations. This negative correlation indicates that more conservative legislators tend to give fewer positive evaluations of the international environment, or of other states, than their more liberal counterparts. This result generally mirrors what we find using the Republican Party dummy variable. We should note that the First dimension NOMINATE score is correlated at approximately .95 with the Republican dummy variable. We should also note that we lose 244 observations in the ideology models due to missing values in the NOMINATE data. The remaining control variables perform as in previous models.

Table A6 replicates our basic models, but includes a variable to capture legislators' tenure in Congress. Specifically, this variable is a count of the number of congresses that an individual legislator has served in their current chamber. Reviewers have raised the possibility that the likelihood that a given legislator speaks on the international environment is shaped by their seniority and position in Congress. The tenure variable is positive and significant in both models, indicating that more senior members of Congress are more likely to make threat assessments—both positive and negative—than less senior colleagues. Importantly, this finding does not affect our primary findings.

Table A7 replicates our basic model using a state-congress unit of analysis. The manufacturing variable is already measured at the state level, and so we collapsed the remaining variables down to capture the proportion of each state's delegation that is Republican, college

---

2009. "Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap." *Political Analysis* 17(3): 261–275.

educated, and that has served as a military officer. The results demonstrate that even when we change the basic structure of the analysis, we continue to find a positive and statistically significant correlation between manufacturing and negative evaluations.

**Table A4.**

Negative Binomial Models Predicting Legislator Evaluations of the International Environment

	House Models		Senate Models	
	(1) Negative Evaluations	(2) Positive Evaluations	(3) Negative Evaluations	(4) Positive Evaluations
Manufacturing	2.171*** (0.784)	-1.589* (0.862)	3.514*** (1.036)	1.062 (1.306)
Republican	-0.171 (0.206)	-0.474** (0.210)	-0.0344 (0.333)	-0.947** (0.389)
Attended College	0.319 (0.200)	0.283 (0.222)	0.119 (0.342)	-0.725** (0.325)
Officer	1.026*** (0.235)	0.105 (0.280)	0.230 (0.326)	-0.0840 (0.359)
Constant	-4.954*** (0.425)	-2.930*** (0.355)	-3.694*** (0.633)	-2.021*** (0.361)
ln $\alpha$	1.445*** (0.284)	2.043*** (0.243)	-2.485 (11.26)	0.0565 (0.799)
Observations	4689	4689	1157	1157

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for individual congresses not shown.

Two-tailed significance tests used: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A5.**

Negative Binomial Models Predicting Legislator Evaluations of the International Environment

	Base Model with Legislator Ideology		State Characteristics with Legislator Ideology	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Negative Evaluations	Positive Evaluations	Negative Evaluations	Positive Evaluations
Manufacturing	2.545*** (0.696)	-0.907 (0.773)	1.687** (0.820)	-0.657 (0.906)
Ideology	-0.0241 (0.211)	-0.663*** (0.229)	0.283 (0.235)	-0.684*** (0.243)
Attended College	0.262 (0.176)	-0.00470 (0.182)	0.272 (0.177)	-0.0216 (0.178)
Officer	0.835*** (0.198)	0.0717 (0.219)	0.766*** (0.194)	0.0295 (0.225)
Coastal State			0.668*** (0.185)	-0.0276 (0.170)
Shipbuilding			-88.37 (92.45)	-140.5 (151.3)
Senate Dummy			0.115 (0.190)	0.208 (0.194)
Size of Delegation			0.000432 (0.00728)	0.00722 (0.00928)
Constant	-4.584*** (0.358)	-2.912*** (0.299)	-4.733*** (0.350)	-3.042*** (0.310)
$\ln \alpha$	1.297*** (0.270)	1.807*** (0.240)	1.218*** (0.257)	1.800*** (0.246)
Observations	5602	5602	5602	5602

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for individual congresses not shown.

Two-tailed significance tests used: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



**Table A6**

Negative Binomial Models Predicting Legislator Evaluations of the International Environment.  
 Legislator tenure variable included.

	(1) Negative Evaluations	(2) Positive Evaluations
Manufacturing	2.734*** (0.661)	-1.037 (0.739)
Republican	-0.199 (0.178)	-0.706*** (0.186)
Attended College	0.281 (0.176)	0.0264 (0.183)
Officer	0.744*** (0.202)	-0.152 (0.234)
Tenure	0.0827*** (0.0235)	0.155*** (0.0232)
Constant	-4.845*** (0.341)	-3.129*** (0.296)
ln alpha	1.312*** (0.267)	1.696*** (0.242)
Observations	5846	5846

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note: Fixed effects for individuals congresses not shown. Two-tailed significance tests used: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table A7**

Negative Binomial Models Predicting Legislator Evaluations of the International Environment

	(1) Negative Evaluations	(2) Positive Evaluations
Manufacturing	4.086 <sup>***</sup> (0.711)	1.038 (0.797)
Republican	-0.436 <sup>*</sup> (0.264)	-1.323 <sup>***</sup> (0.246)
College	0.409 (0.502)	0.121 (0.474)
Officer	0.190 (0.708)	-0.418 (0.542)
Constant	-2.295 <sup>***</sup> (0.544)	-0.411 (0.449)
ln alpha	0.0639 (0.233)	-0.0584 (0.276)
Observations	546	546

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Fixed effects for individuals congresses not shown.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## 5. Protectionist Elements of the Agricultural Sector

As we explain in the main text, American agriculture was predominantly export-oriented during the period we consider. There were some important exceptions to this generalization, however.

These suggest a possible modification to our analysis, which we present in this appendix.

Table A7 below provides information on twelve agricultural commodities for which we could obtain both trade and production data. They are listed in order of their import-sensitivity. The special condition of sugar and wool are easy to see. Imports constituted a substantial share of consumption for both commodities in 1900, in spite of relatively high tariffs. A substantial amount of sugar was exported, but the commodity was still quite import-sensitive. Though not as important to American farmers, rice was in a similar position. By contrast, the next three most import sensitive commodities--tobacco, cotton, and barley--were all highly export-oriented. The remaining six commodities faced little import competition.<sup>7</sup>

**Table A8**  
Trade Exposure for Major Agricultural Commodities

Commodity	Imports / (Domestic production + Imports)	Exports / Domestic production	Share of listed farm commodities
Sugar	66.3%	13.1%	2.1%
Wool	20.2%	0.8%	1.8%
Rice	19.4%	8.5%	0.3%
Tobacco	18.9%	51.6%	2.3%
Cotton	2.2%	65.5%	14.9%
Barley	0.2%	26.9%	1.7%
Hay	0.2%	0.2%	19.4%
Wheat	0.1%	19.8%	14.8%
Oats	0.0%	5.8%	8.7%
Rye	0.0%	11.7%	0.5%
Corn	0.0%	10.3%	33.2%
Buckwheat	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%

<sup>7</sup> The value of livestock was not comparable to the value of the other commodities listed, because a substantial proportion of the animals valued in 1900 were not sold or consumed in that year. Only a small share of the livestock valued was exported (1.5%) and imports constituted only a small share of the total value of imports and domestic stock (2.3%).

While the export-oriented agricultural sector had foreign policy interests opposed to those of the more protectionist manufacturing sector, producers of sugar, wool, and rice constitute a likely exception. Sugar and wool received substantial tariff protection. Representatives of agricultural areas that relied on the production of these commodities might well side with the representatives of manufacturing areas on foreign policy issues. To test this conjecture, we computed the share of farm output consisting of sugar, wool, and rice for each state. Members from states where agriculture relied relatively heavily on these three commodities should give more negative and fewer positive speeches.

**Table A9**

## Negative Binomial Models Predicting Legislator Evaluations of the International Environment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive
	Evaluations	Evaluations	Evaluations	Evaluations	Evaluations	Evaluations
Manufacturing	2.561 <sup>***</sup> (0.697)	-2.372 <sup>***</sup> (0.739)	2.856 <sup>***</sup> (0.698)	-1.470 <sup>**</sup> (0.743)	2.277 <sup>***</sup> (0.782)	-1.073 (0.865)
Sugar, Wool, and Rice	2.559 <sup>*</sup> (1.473)	-3.219 (2.396)	2.121 (1.346)	-3.027 (2.363)	1.473 (1.399)	-3.248 (2.509)
Republican			-0.119 (0.174)	-0.537 <sup>***</sup> (0.186)	0.0537 (0.190)	-0.551 <sup>**</sup> (0.197)
Attended College			0.273 (0.176)	0.0262 (0.181)	0.273 (0.177)	0.0126 (0.176)
Officer			0.811 <sup>***</sup> (0.196)	0.0718 (0.218)	0.751 <sup>***</sup> (0.194)	0.0202 (0.225)
Coastal State					0.583 <sup>***</sup> (0.181)	0.00834 (0.171)
Shipbuilding, Iron, and Steel Production					-93.65 (91.78)	-143.1 (146.6)
Senate					0.109 (0.192)	0.230 (0.198)
Size of Delegation					-0.000383 (0.00737)	0.00324 (0.00933)
Constant	-4.178 <sup>***</sup> (0.356)	-2.460 <sup>***</sup> (0.256)	-4.696 <sup>***</sup> (0.358)	-2.555 <sup>***</sup> (0.291)	-4.913 <sup>***</sup> (0.349)	-2.663 <sup>***</sup> (0.314)
Inalpha						
Constant	1.447 <sup>***</sup> (0.284)	1.872 <sup>***</sup> (0.231)	1.327 <sup>***</sup> (0.270)	1.833 <sup>***</sup> (0.237)	1.277 <sup>***</sup> (0.255)	1.822 <sup>***</sup> (0.243)
Observations	5846	5846	5846	5846	5846	5846

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: Fixed effects for individuals congresses not shown.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## References

- Bailey, Michael, and David W. Brady. 1998. "Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(2): 522-44.
- Bearce, David H. 2003. "Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes." *International Organization* 57(2): 373-410.
- Burton, Theodore (OH). 1907. "Naval Appropriation Bill." *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*. Vol. 41. Page 3048. Accessed February 5, 2013.
- Fordham, Benjamin O. 1998. "Economic interests, party, and ideology in early Cold War era U.S. foreign policy." *International Organization* 52(2): 359-95.
- Fordham, Benjamin O. 2008. "Economic Interests and Congressional Voting on American Foreign Policy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(5): 623-40.
- Fordham, Benjamin O., and Timothy J. McKeown. 2003. "Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy." *International Organization* 57(3): 519-49.
- Hawke, G. R. 1975. "The United States Tariff and Industrial Protection in the Late Nineteenth Century." *Economic History Review* 28(1): 84-99.
- Meyer, Adolph (LA). 1907. "Naval Appropriation Bill." *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*. Vol. 41. Page 3055. Accessed February 5, 2013.
- Sherwood, Isaac (OH). 1910. "Naval Appropriation Bill." *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*. Vol. 45. Page 3837. Accessed February 1, 2013.
- Weeks, John (MA). 1907. "Naval Appropriation Bill." *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*. Vol. 41. Page 3949. Accessed February 1, 2013.