What We Don't Know (or Refuse to Say) About Gender and Trade Policy Preferences

Abstract

Survey research on trade policy attitudes has frequently found that women are more protectionist than men. One possible reason for these findings that previous research has not considered is the fact that women are more likely than men to say they have "no opinion" response to many survey questions, including those concerning trade policy. We assess this possibility using an original survey experiment. The presence or absence of a prompt reminding respondents that this option is available can influence the apparent size of the gender gap. The way one treats these responses also makes a difference. Treating these responses as missing data has much the same effect. "No opinion" is a substantively interesting response category and deserves to be modeled alongside affirmative positions on trade. Using a multinominal logit model, we find that the gender gap in the propensity to express no opinion is actually larger and arguably more important than the gender gap in support for free trade or protection. Our research points to the importance of explicitly modeling "no opinion" responses alongside support and opposition to international trade.

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A new body of research has emerged investigating individual-level preferences for foreign economic policy. Using public opinion surveys, researchers have sought to identify the sources of attitudes toward international trade and foreign investment, including respondents' material interests, knowledge of the economy, and nationalist views. One unexpected finding in many of these studies is that women are more likely than men to favor protectionist policies. The difference appears to be present over time and across countries. This gender gap has intrigued scholars because it persists even in models that control for many intuitive economic explanations of trade policy attitudes.

In this paper we consider a problem that is widely overlooked in investigations of the gender gap. While there is agreement on the direction of the gender difference, its true size has been difficult to pin down. This problem arises in part from the thorny issue of "no opinion" responses in public opinion surveys. On the one hand, scholars disagree on whether survey questions should include an explicit "don't know" or "no opinion" answer option. On the other hand, there appears to be disagreement over how to treat these responses in empirical analysis. These issues raise important questions in research on trade policy attitudes because respondents often have limited knowledge of international trade and national trade policy. Previous research has found that many respondents will say they have no opinion in response to questions about trade, and that they regard the issue as relatively unimportant (Guisinger 2009).

A further complication arises from the fact that women are more likely than men to choose "no opinion" answer options. This is true not only of survey responses on trade policy attitudes but also on many other issues. Our research question is what effect, if any, does the gender gap in "no opinion" responses have on our estimates of the gender gap in trade policy attitudes? We are argue that decisions about whether to include a "no opinion" prompt in survey

questions as well as different treatments of these "no opinion" responses can influence estimates of the gender gap. We test this argument using both existing survey data and a new survey experiment. [ADD STUFF]

This paper proceeds in four sections. First, we will review previous research on the gender gap in trade policy attitudes and other issues. Second, we will examine the effect of different treatments of "no opinion" responses on estimates of the size of the gender gap using both existing survey data and the results of a new survey experiment. The third section presents a multinomial logit model that explicitly considers the "no opinion" responses alongside affirmative opinions about trade. This model allows us to assess the effect of these "no opinion" responses on the size of the gender gap. The final section summarizes and concludes.

The Gender Gap in Trade Policy Attitudes

Research on trade policy attitudes has found a consistent gender gap in support for free trade. In many surveys, women are significantly more likely than men to express opposition to trade liberalization and support for protectionist policies. For example, using cross-national data from the 1995 World Values Survey and the 1995 and 2003 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that being male increases the probability of supporting trade by more than 7 percentage points. Other research reports similar findings (Sinnott and O'Rourke 2001; Baker 2005, 932; Beaulieu, Yatawara, and Wang 2005, 955; but see Baker 2003).

Two studies have examined possible causes of this gender gap in more detail. Burgoon and Hiscox (2004; 2008) conducted an original survey of 1,610 Americans to test a number of candidate explanations. They find that while skills levels, employment, and standard socio-

economic predictors have the anticipated effects on support for free trade, these variables cannot account for the gender gap. Similarly, perceived job security, access to family benefits, consumption tastes, and gendered differences in political values also fail to explain why men support free trade at higher rates than women. Instead, the study finds preliminary evidence that gender differences in knowledge of economic issues influences the size of the gender gap: Controlling for men's greater familiarity with the country-composition of NAFTA reduces the gender gap in support for trade by almost half. Differences in political information appear to be part of the story, yet a statistically significant gender gap persists even when controlling for these differences.

Beaulieu and Napier (2008) use data from 1995 and 2003 ISSP surveys to examine the gender gap in a cross-national study. The authors find that differences in support for trade remain robust even after controlling for a wide range of other considerations that might have accounted for it, including education, sector of employment, political affiliation, and marital status. Additional country-level characteristics such as openness to trade, GDP per capita, and female participation in the labor market also appear to be of limited predictive value. While the study finds that the gender gap is smaller in poorer countries, the authors conclude that gender differences in support for free trade may be due to "immeasurable attributes" (2008, 28).

Trade is not the only public policy issue on which men and women seem to disagree substantially. In addition to distinct gender differences in voting decisions within the U.S. electorate, researchers have identified gender gaps in policy preferences as diverse as support for the use of force, social welfare spending, gun control, and political tolerance (e.g., Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Golebiowska 1999; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001; Erikson and Tedin 2005, 207-9). The explanations offered for gendered policy attitudes are both numerous and diverse.

They include arguments about socialization and political knowledge (e.g., Burns, Verba, and Schlotzman 2001; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), gendered roles of men and women in society (e.g., Ruddick 1980; Burns and Shoemaker 1988), and blame attribution for policy outcomes (Welch and Hibbing 1992). The wealth of causal explanations has led some researchers to suggest that it is more accurate to speak of gender "gaps" (Shapiro and Mahajan 1988, fn.2; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001).

One explanation that has not yet been considered in the context of trade policy attitudes has to do with the treatment of "no opinion" responses in surveys. Recent research has found a significant gender difference in the rate at which respondents choose "no opinion" options to survey questions probing political knowledge (e.g., Kenski and Jamieson 2001; Frazer and Macdonald 2003) and policy attitudes (e.g., Shapiro and Mahajan 1988). At least two studies suggest that men are more likely than women to guess on questions when they are unsure, leading researchers to overestimate the gender gap in political knowledge (Mondak and Anderson 2004; Lizotte and Sidman 2009). Moreover, research has found that men are more likely than women to volunteer an opinion on fictitious policy issues (Bishop et al. 1980; Sturgis and Smith 2010, 77). We believe that these findings have important implications for research on the gender gap in trade policy attitudes. If "no opinion" responses vary systematically with gender on trade policy questions then the treatment of "no opinion" responses could affect estimates of the gender gap.

Dealing with "No Opinion" Responses

International trade and national trade policy are highly esoteric issues for most people. Although on occasion they are prominent topics in the elite discourse of government officials and the news

media, it is safe to assume that trade and trade policy do not loom large among the day-to-day concerns of most potential survey respondents. Even among the politically interested and informed, international trade is likely to be less prominent than other public policy issues, such social welfare policies, even when those are indirectly related to trade. It stands to reason that most people neither know nor care much about trade policy.

Evidence from survey research bears this out. In the 1992 American National Election Study (ANES), only 2.15 percent of respondents mentioned trade as one of the top three "most important problems" facing the country. This finding is especially noteworthy because NAFTA was ostensibly a major election issue that year. Guisinger (2009) reports similar result from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). Of 1000 respondents asked to rank the importance of different policy issues, "international trade" received the lowest ranking with 52 percent of respondents considering trade to be only "somewhat" or "not" important. Unsurprisingly, rates of "don't know" or "no opinion" responses to trade questions are quite high whenever respondents are offered this option. In the 2006 CCES questions on political knowledge, rates of non-response to the trade policy question were higher than on any other issue item: 54 percent of respondents offered no opinion.

[Table 1 about here]

Low levels of knowledge and the low salience of trade policy issues have important implications for surveys that try to ascertain trade policy attitudes. The treatment of "no opinion" responses might not have any obvious bearing on the gender gap in trade policy attitudes if men and women had the same propensity to give this answer. In fact, women are much more likely to

give this response. Table 1 presents a summary of responses to questions on trade policy from three surveys used to examine trade attitudes in previous research. In every case, women were more likely to give "no opinion" responses than men were. The rate of "no opinion" responses varies depending on whether respondents were explicitly reminded that this option was available. In the ANES, the question included the phrase "or haven't you thought much about this issue?" In this case, more than 30 percent of the sample chose the "don't know" option, compared to less than ten percent in the other two surveys. The gender gap in choosing the "don't know" option is also much larger in this case--more than 18 percentage points. The relatively low rate of "no opinion" responses in the other surveys might well stem from the fact that respondents might not have realized that this option was available. We will return later to the implications of reducing the rate of "no opinion" responses in this way.

The table also illustrates the extent to which the way one treats "no opinion" responses can affect the apparent size of the gender gap in trade policy attitudes. When "no opinion" responses are treated as missing data, the gender gap can appear quite large. In all three surveys, a higher proportion of the women who expressed an opinion supported trade protection than did men who expressed an opinion. If the "don't know" or "no opinion" response is included as a third category, the gender gap is smaller because more women than men respond in this way. In the case of the ANES, where respondents were explicitly reminded that a "don't know" option was available, the direction of the gender gap is actually reversed when these responses are considered. A higher percentage of male respondents supported both trade protection and free trade because so many female respondents preferred to say they had no opinion.[1]

[1] As the statistics in Table 1 suggest, lumping the "don't know" or "no opinion" responses together with one of the affirmative response categories could be highly misleading. In the case of the ANES trade policy item, which had the largest share of these responses, including these responses with either support or opposition to new limits on international trade would reverse the direction of the gender gap.

We can tell from examining existing survey data that the treatment of "no opinion" responses could make a difference. The question we cannot answer with these data is whether the inclusion of an explicit "no opinion" prompt makes a difference for our estimate of the size of the gender gap. The best way to answer this question is to conduct a survey experiment in which some respondents receive this prompt, but others do not.

Existing research thus tells us that there are actually two relevant gender gaps. Women and men differ not only in their attitudes toward trade but also in their propensity to say they don't know in response to question about this issue. Dealing with these two gaps is both a matter of survey design and also of how we treat the responses in our empirical analyses. The best way to show the implications of different decisions about survey design and analysis is through an experiment. The next section will set out a survey experiment that allows us to test the effect of including or excluding a "no opinion" prompt on the apparent size of the gender gap. It will also allow us to model "no opinion" responses as a legitimate response category.

A Survey Experiment

With funding from the TESS program, we conducted an original survey experiment to assess the effect of including or excluding a "no opinion" prompt on the size of the gender gap. Knowledge Networks administered the survey to a national sample of 2,843 respondents over a two week period in September 2012. The experiment began with the following question: "Do you favor or oppose increasing trade with other nations?" This item is identical to the one used by Hiscox (2006, 766). It has the virtue of avoiding reference to tariffs or other commercial policies with which respondents might be unfamiliar, as well as other potential framing problems. All respondents were given four answer categories: strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat

oppose, and strongly oppose. As an experimental treatment, half the respondents were given a question ended with the phrase "or haven't you thought much about this issue," a phrase borrowed from the ANES trade policy question discussed earlier. These respondents were also given an explicit "no opinion" response category.

Table 2 presents the responses to these questions, disaggregated by gender and whether or not the respondents received the treatment. When prompted and given an explicit "no opinion" response option, a substantial proportion of respondents selected it. Women were quite a bit more likely to do so. We also find a gender gap on support for increasing trade in both the treatment and control group. As in previous surveys, men were substantially more likely to favor increasing trade with other nations. But the size of this gender gap is quite different for the treatment and control group. The overall size of the gender gap among those supporting increased trade was 19.4 percentage points in the treatment group the received the "no opinion" prompt, but only 6.97 in the control group.

This large change in the size of the gender gap was due mainly to women disproportionately selecting the "somewhat favor" option when the "no opinion" response was not presented. The share of women in the "somewhat favor" category increased by 14 percentage points when the no opinion response option was not offered. The share in the "strongly favor" category increased by roughly the same amount as the "somewhat oppose category, increasing by seven and six percentage points, respectively. By contrast, male respondents went to each of the affirmative response options in roughly similar proportions when the "no opinion" option was omitted. The share of male respondents in each affirmative category increased by between two and six points. Given that previous research shows that many people actually have no

opinion about international trade and trade policy, omitting the "no opinion" option is likely to produce biased estimates of the gender gap.

[Table 2 about here.]

Table 2 also illustrates the consequences of treating "no opinion" responses as if they were missing data. The third set of figures shows the difference between men and women if the "no opinion" responses generated by the experimental prompt were simply dropped from the analysis, as is commonly done in the literature. Although the apparent size of the gender gap is closer to what it would be if the "no opinion" responses were included, it is still smaller than it would be under this condition. More seriously, after dropping 22 percent of the responses, the remaining sample contains an artificially small number of women. As we shall explain shortly, it is also biased in other respects, because many other considerations commonly used to predict support or opposition to trade, such as education and income, also predict "no opinion" responses.

Even if dropping or suppressing "no opinion" responses did not create a biased sample, the sources of these responses on trade would be important and worthy of more serious attention. Previous research suggests that widespread indifference to trade policy means that voters are unlikely to hold their elected representatives responsible for the positions they take on the issue (Guisinger 2009). "No opinion" responses on issue like race might conceal real opinions that respondents suppress because they are socially unacceptable (e.g., Berinsky 2004, 51-83). In this case, it might make sense to design a survey that made "no opinion" responses more difficult to

choose. Opinions about trade are far less controversial, so respondents are unlikely to suppress their real views if they have any. In all likelihood, "no opinion" really means "no opinion."

In addition to producing biased estimates of the gender gap, suppressing "no opinion" responses through survey design or treating them as missing when analyzing the data throws away some potentially important information about the way gender and other considerations actually influence opinions about international trade. Previous analyses have focused on how considerations like education, income, home ownership, and other attitudes might lead respondents to support rather than to oppose international trade, or vice versa. Explicitly modeling the "no opinion" response category suggests that the way these considerations affect respondent's decisions about this option also make a difference. In fact, most variables that influence attitudes toward trade do so in part by making the pro-trade or anti-trade position more attractive relative to each other, and in part by making respondents more or less likely to offer a "no opinion" response.

In order to show the value of considering "no opinion" responses more seriously, Table 3 presents the results of three models of trade policy attitudes using the data from our survey experiment. The first two are binary logit models similar to those used in most previous research. The first employs data from our control group, which lacked a "no opinion" prompt and did not explicitly provide respondents with this answer option. The second employs data from respondents who were given a "no opinion" option, but treats the "no opinion" responses as missing data. The third is a multinomial logit model that treats "no opinion" as a third answer category alongside expressions of support and opposition to increased international trade. The independent variables in the model are similar to those employed in previous research, including gender, education, and other considerations.

[Table 3 about here.]

The regression results in Table 3 produce quite different estimates of the gender gap in attitudes toward trade. The probability that a female respondent would express support for increasing trade was 0.09 lower in the first model, 0.19 lower in the second model, and 0.22 lower in the multinomial logit model. These results closely parallel the descriptive statistics on our experiment presented in Table 2. The multinomial logit model also provides additional information about the effect of gender that the binary logit models do not. Because it models the probability of a "no opinion" response alongside the pro-trade and anti-trade positions, it allows us to assess what part of the gender gap in pro-trade attitudes comes from movement out of the anti-trade category, and what part comes from movement out of the "no opinion" category. Figure 1 shows the estimated effect of gender in all three regression models.

[Figure 1 about here.]

As Figure 1 suggests, the gender gap is due more to women's greater propensity to offer a "no opinion" response to the trade question than to their preference for the anti-trade position. The fact that men in our survey were 0.22 more likely to express support for trade was due to the fact that they were 0.15 less likely to select the no opinion option and 0.07 less likely to offer an anti-trade response. Put differently, most of the gender gap is due to women's higher propensity to give a "no opinion" response rather than to their tendency to oppose increasing international trade, though both considerations matter.

The gender gap in the anti-trade category was much smaller than that in the pro-trade category. In the binary logit models, the gender gap in the pro- and anti-trade categories is the same by construction. This fact, and their omission of the larger gender gap in the "no opinion" category, leads these models to underestimate its size.

Gender is not the only effect that is distorted by suppressing or omitting "no opinion" responses. Estimates on the effect of any variable related to both affirmative positions on trade policy and the probability of having no opinion may be biased. For example, models that do not include "no opinion" responses appear to overestimate effect of education in our data. The change in the predicted probability of a pro-trade response associated with a change from the lowest to the highest category on the education variable was 0.31 in the first logit model, 0.28 in the second logit model, and 0.24 in the multinomial logit model. Estimates of the effect of income were also different, though these were higher in the multinomial logit model. The change in the predicted probability of a pro-trade response rose from 0.11 in the first logit model, to 0.15 in the second logit model, to 0.18 in the multinomial logit model. Like gender, both education and income are predictors not only of opinions about trade, but also of respondents' propensity to give a "no opinion" answer.

Gender, education, and income all influence both affirmative opinions about international trade and the propensity to give a "no opinion" response to questions about it. However, even some considerations that do not influence favorable or unfavorable opinions about international trade can nevertheless have important effects if they influence whether or not respondents have no opinion about it. Table 4 presents a multinomial logit model of attitudes toward trade identical to the model in Table 3 but with the addition of two independent variables that predict the propensity to give a "no opinion" response, but not a favorable or unfavorable view of

international trade. The first is an indicator of interest in politics. Respondents were asked "how often does the subject of politics come up in conversations with friends?" The second is an indicator of respondents' confidence in their judgments of the economy. They were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Sometimes the economy seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on." Answers to both these questions were coded on a four-point scale.

[Table 4 about here.]

The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the two additional variables have strong and positive effects on the probability of both a pro-trade and an anti-trade response. Respondents who reported that they talked about politics with friends "a lot" (the highest category) had a predicted probability of expressing both a pro-trade and an anti-trade opinion that was 0.21 higher than respondents who said they "never" had political conversations (the lowest category). This effect was as large as that associated with gender. Economic confidence had similar, though substantively much smaller effects. Because they increased the chance of both responses, neither variable is a significant predictor of opinions about trade in models that do not consider "no opinion" responses. Nevertheless, the size of these effects suggest that considerations that influence whether people are interested in international trade as a public issue can produce large effects on the probability that they express either a pro-trade or an anti-trade opinion.

Figure 2 shows how interest and confidence affect trade policy opinions among men and women. As the figure suggests, interest and confidence can produce large changes in the proportion of respondents who have no opinion about trade. Changes in "no opinion" responses,

in turn, can produce large shifts in the proportion of respondents who express support or opposition to free trade. Though the gender gaps persist among both groups of respondents depicted in the Figure, the changes associated in the probability of each response category associated with interest and confidence are substantially larger than those associated with gender. These changes do not alter the relationship between pro-trade and anti-trade opinions, but they produce enormous differences in the actual probability respondents will take either of these positions. Clearly, accounting for why some respondents hold opinions about trade while others are indifferent explaining or predicting individual opinions.

Conclusion [This is the unrevised version from the last version of the paper]

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that we need to take "don't know" responses more seriously than previous research has. The higher rate at which female respondents select this option can have a large effect on estimates of the gap between male and female attitudes on trade. Considerations that influence the propensity to give a "don't know" response can affect estimates of the size of the gender gap even if they do not actually influence respondents' preferences for free trade or protection. The gender gap in "don't know" responses concerning trade is actually larger and arguably more important than the gender gap in affirmative opinions. Our findings have implications for the design of surveys on trade. They also point to the importance of considerations that move people from having no opinion on trade to taking an affirmative position one way or the other.

Survey questions on trade and trade policy should include an explicit "don't know" prompt. Previous research has found that many people know little about trade and do not consider it an important issue. This reality suggests that not offering a "don't know" option is

more likely to elicit non-attitudes than to persuade respondents to reveal attitudes that they would otherwise have suppressed. Ignorance and indifference on trade are politically important phenomena, so our surveys should attempt to measure them as accurately as possible and treat them as an equally valid response category to be explained.

The alternatives to explicitly modeling "don't know" answers are clearly less satisfactory. Lumping the "don't know" responses with other response categories can give widely varying estimates of the size of the gender gap, depending on that category with which these responses are included. Because these other responses are substantively different from "don't know," there is little to recommend this practice. Treating the "don't know" responses as missing data is also problematic because these data are actually not missing, and the process generating them is not random with respect to the other independent variables commonly used to predict trade policy attitudes, such as gender, income, education, and the like.

Our findings about "don't know" responses and the gender gap suggest some broader conclusions about the sources of trade policy attitudes. Most research on this issue in the political economy literature focuses on considerations that should influence attitudes toward trade protection. Previous research on the gender gap has focused on considerations related to gender that might also influence trade policy attitudes, such as the employment status of women compared to men. In fact, considerations that do not directly influence preferences on trade policy but that lead people to form an opinion can be very important on this issue. For example, we found that respondents' political interest and level of information had substantial effects on the size of the gender gap on trade policy even though they did not make respondents' more likely to favor free trade or protection. Other considerations, such as confidence and gender, influence both.

The importance of "don't know" responses in research on trade policy attitudes applies to more than just the effect of gender. For example, treating "don't know" as a substantively interesting response could inform research on framing effects and trade attitudes. The information that frames provide might influence whether respondents form an opinion in addition to influencing what position they take. The former effect might even be more important than the latter, since even respondents who disagree with the information in the frame might use it to take an opposing position instead of saying they don't know. Our research suggests that modeling "don't know" responses alongside affirmative opinions might make a difference for conclusions about any policy issue where respondents' knowledge and interest is limited.

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Table 1.
Gender and Trade Policy Attitudes in the United States

International Social Survey Program, 1995

"Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations between the United States and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy?"

	Male	Female	Male	Female
Agree or agree strongly	66.1%	70.8%	63.2%	65.3%
Neither agree nor disagree	16.7	17.4	16.0	16.1
Disagree or disagree strongly	17.2	11.8	16.5	10.9
Don't know			4.4	7.8

World Values Survey, 1995

"Do you think it is better if goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; or that there should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country?"

	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Limit imports	69.5%	76.4%	66.2%	72.3%
Allow imports	30.6	23.6	29.1	22.3
Don't know			4.7	5.4

American National Election Study, 1992

"Some people favor increasing limits on foreign imports a lot in order to protect American jobs. Others favor decreasing the limits a lot in order to lower consumer prices and help American exports. Do you favor increasing the limits on foreign imports, decreasing these limits, should these limits remain the same as they are now, or haven't you thought much about this?"

	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Favor new limits	63.2%	71.5%	50.1%	44.1%
Oppose new limits	36.8	28.5	29.2	17.6
Don't know			20.7	38.4

Table 2.
Probit Models of Trade Attitudes from 1995 ISSP Survey

	Coding of Dependent Variable:			
Don't limit imports	1	1	0	0
Limit imports	0	0	1	1
Don't know	Missing	0	Missing	0
Female	-0.17* (0.10)	-0.19* (0.09)	0.18** (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Union member	-0.48** (0.19)	-0.46** (0.18)	0.42** (0.14)	0.39** (0.13)
Blue collar occupation	-0.42** (0.20)	-0.42** (0.19)	0.08 (0.13)	0.02 (0.12)
Unemployed	0.12 (0.26)	0.09 (0.25)	0.08 (0.23)	0.02 (0.22)
Family income ($ thousands)	0.004** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)
Education:				
Some high school	0.84* (0.45)	0.81* (0.44)	-0.46 (0.30)	-0.28 (0.23)
High school grad	0.71* (0.42)	0.71* (0.42)	-0.68** (0.27)	-0.37* (0.21)
Some college	1.03** (0.43)	1.02** (0.42)	-1.11** (0.28)	-0.77** (0.22)
College grad	1.50** (0.44)	1.48** (0.44)	-1.46** (0.30)	-1.09** (0.25)
Ideology:				
Center	0.17 (0.11)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)
Right	0.09 (0.12)	0.10 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)
Constant	-2.02** (0.47)	-1.99** (0.46)	1.09** (0.31)	0.75** (0.26)
Observations	1,155	1,223	1,155	1,223

Note: Dependent variables developed from the indicated recoding of responses the trade question in the 1995 ISSP survey. Exact wording is presented in Table 1. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
**p<0.05
*p<0.10

Table 3.
Results of Survey Experiment with Binghamton University Students

	DK prompt			No prompt		
	Women	Men	Gap	Women	Men	Gap
Strongly Favor	13.28	33.93	-20.65	22.31	37.31	-15.00
Somewhat Favor	50.78	44.64	+6.14	63.85	49.25	+14.60
Somewhat oppose	10.16	4.46	+5.70	10.08	9.70	+0.38
Strongly oppose	0.78	3.57	-2.79	0.77	3.73	-3.04
DK	25.00	13.39	+11.61			
n	128	112		130	134	

Note: Figures for each response category are percentages. The survey question was: "Do you favor or oppose increasing trade with other nations?"

Table 4.
Gender Gaps in Foreign Policy Opinions

	Size of Gender Gap among supporting responses		
	DK prompt included	No DK prompt	DK responses treated as missing
Increasing trade	**-14.51***	**-0.40**	**-5.31**
U.S. use of military force	-11.57*	-4.43	-8.91
Foreign investment in United States	-21.01*	+1.23	-20.92*
Increasing foreign aid	+1.78	-7.74*	-5.30
Activist U.S. foreign policy	+2.33	+0.60	+4.24

Note: Figures for each reported gap are the female-male difference in the percentage of supportive respondents.
*$p < 0.05$

Table 5.
Multinomial Logit Models of Trade Policy Attitudes, 1992 ANES

	Model 1		Model 2	
Base Category= "Don't Know"	Support	Opposition	Support	Opposition
Female	-0.66** (0.11)	-0.96** (0.13)	-0.48** (0.12)	-0.74** (0.14)
Union Member	0.08 (0.15)	-0.37** (0.19)	0.12 (0.16)	-0.31 (0.20)
Age	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)
Unemployed	-0.15 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.27)	-0.12 (0.21)	-0.29 (0.28)
Blue Collar Occupation	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.40* (0.23)	0.25 (0.18)	-0.42* (0.24)
Education				
High school graduate	0.41** (0.15)	0.26 (0.21)	0.14 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.23)
Some college	0.51** (0.17)	0.92** (0.23)	0.04 (0.19)	0.42* (0.25)
College graduate	0.06 (0.21)	1.16** (0.25)	-0.47** (0.23)	0.53* (0.29)
Graduate school	0.20 (0.27)	1.36** (0.30)	-0.41 (0.31)	0.58* (0.35)
Family Income				
Fourth highest quintile	0.20 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.19)	0.18 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.21)
Third highest quintile	0.37** (0.16)	0.43** (0.20)	0.30* (0.17)	0.39* (0.21)
Second highest quintile	0.55** (0.20)	0.66** (0.24)	0.418 (0.21)	0.57** (0.25)
Highest quintile	0.60** (0.19)	0.68** (0.22)	0.55** (0.20)	0.66** (0.24)
Liberal Ideology	0.37** (0.14)	0.46** (0.17)	0.001 (0.17)	0.09 (0.21)
Conservative Ideology	0.41** (0.13)	0.62** (0.16)	0.002 (0.16)	0.25 (0.19)
Democrat	0.08 (0.12)	0.02 (0.15)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.16)
Republican	-0.23 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.17)	-0.29** (0.15)	-0.13 (0.17)
Politically Confident			0.12 (0.14)	0.59** (0.16)
Political Information			0.93** (0.25)	1.03** (0.32)
Discusses Politics			0.58** (0.15)	0.34* (0.20)
No Ideology			-0.54** (0.16)	-0.47** (0.22)
Constant	0.13 (0.24)	-0.83** (0.31)	-0.21 (0.31)	-1.15** (0.40)
Observations	2,195		1,995	

Note: "Don't Know" is the omitted response category. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
**p<0.05
*p<0.1

Table 6.
Predicted Probability of Responses and Gender Gaps under Several Conditions, 1992 ANES

	Sample proportions			MNL model without variables predicting DK responses			MNL model with variables predicting DK responses			MNL model with variables predicting DK responses, likely opinion-holders		
	Male	Female	Gap	Male	Female	Gap	Male	Female	Gap	Male	Female	Gap
Favor new limits	.501	.441	-.060	.587	.509	-.078	.656	.614	-.042	.629	.631	+.003
Oppose new limits	.292	.176	-.116	.198	.128	-.070	.169	.122	-.047	.273	.210	-.063
Don't know	.207	.384	+.177	.216	.364	+.148	.175	.264	+.089	.099	.159	+.060

Note: The second and third sets of predicted probabilities come from the models presented in Table 5, with all other variables set at their modes. The fourth set of predicted probabilities also come from the model in Table 5, but the variables intended primarily to predict a "don't know" response are set at the values that most strongly predict an affirmative opinion. These respondents are thus confident about their political understanding, highly informed in the opinion of the interviewer, expressed a political ideology, and reported discussing politics at home.

Figure 1.
The Gender Gap with Different Dependent Variables



Figure 2.
Four Types of Survey Responses to Attitude Questions

Take an affirmative position?	Hold an opinion? Yes	Hold an opinion? No
Yes	Expressed opinion	Non-attitude
No	Suppressed opinion	Genuine "don't know"

Figure 3.
Effects of Change from "Male" to "Female"