

**Seminar in Foreign Policy**  
**PLSC 661A**  
**Fall 2017**

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Office hours: Wednesday, 1:00-2:00; Friday, 9:30-11:30; and by appointment, in LNG-58

This class has two goals. The first is to introduce graduate students to some of the major issues in research on foreign policy in a variety of settings. Theories of foreign policy focus on the preferences and choices of individual political actors rather than the outcome of their interactions, though these are obviously related. Scholars have suggested a diverse array of reasons for these actors' choices and preferences, according very different roles to international pressures, domestic political considerations, rational calculation, psychological processes, and the like. In order to give you a better understanding of the current state of research on each topic, most of the works we will read are recent. This fact should not be taken to mean that older work is irrelevant or inferior. I added a few classic older works to underscore this point. The second--and arguably more important--goal of the course is to help graduate students identify topics for their own research. Each week we will spend some of our time explicitly discussing what the week's readings suggest for future research. Hopefully, each student with relevant interests will come away from the class with a few workable research ideas that could be developed into conference papers, articles, or a dissertation project. Identifying research topics is more important in this class than it would be in a core seminar, such as PLSC 650, which is primarily intended to introduce students to the literature in the field.

**Course Materials**

The articles and book excerpts listed on the syllabus will be available through databases maintained by the library. I will post PDF version of the book chapters on the Blackboard page for the course. We will read four books in their entirety. These will be available for purchase at the University bookstore as well as from the usual online sources. They are:

Baum, Matthew, and Philip B. K. Potter. 2015. *War and Democratic Constraint*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Berinsky, Adam. 2009. *In Time of War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. *Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. 2015. *Why Leaders Fight*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

**Course Requirements**

**1. Attendance and participation.** Attendance and participation are critically important. Graduate seminars simply do not work if the participants are not prepared to discuss the reading. Moreover, discussing research intelligently is a major part of academic life. It is an indispensable

skill, and one that improves with practice. Attendance and participation will count for 25 percent of your final grade.

**2. Short papers.** Each student will write two short papers during the semester. Each paper should identify a research question related to the reading for one week, and set out a research design for answering it. You may write a paper about any week you choose, and you may submit more than one paper for a particular week if you have more than one research idea. The papers are due by 5pm on the day before the seminar meeting. (I will try to read them before the seminar meeting and return them then. I may ask you to give the class the gist of your research idea during the seminar. The paper should have the following parts:

- 1) Statement of the research question
- 2) Explanation of why the question is important
- 3) Brief summary of at least one theoretical argument that might answer the question
- 4) List of one or more observable implications of the theoretical argument(s)
- 5) Plan for gathering data to test these observable implications

Although the precise length of these papers is not particularly important, 3-6 pages is a good target zone. Each of these papers will count for 10 percent of your final grade.

**3. Term Paper or Take-Home Final Exam.** Students may complete the course by either by submitting a term paper or by taking a final exam.

**3a. Term Paper Option.** The research paper should be appropriate for presentation to a professional conference. In the case of especially ambitious topics, the paper may be a plan for future research rather than a presentation of actual results. (Such papers are often presented at professional conferences, so these two criteria are not actually in conflict with one another.) You should show that the plan for gathering the data is feasible, perhaps by collecting a small sample of it. The paper may deal with any subject related to the course. You should select your topic and write a brief prospectus by the November 8th class meeting. The prospectus should follow the format set out for the short papers. If you choose to work on one of the topics you selected for a short paper, you may use one of them as your prospectus. As with the short papers, the length is not a very important issue, but 20-30 pages is a reasonable target. The prospectus will count for 5 percent of your course grade. The paper will count for 55 percent of the course grade. The paper is due by 5:00pm on Monday, December 11th.

**3b. Final Exam Option.** This option is intended mainly for students whose principal research interests lie outside the scope of this class. The final exam will consist of two essays written in response to a set of questions available after the final class meeting on November 29th. You may consult any sources you like to complete, subject to the usual restrictions against plagiarism. The final exam will count for 60 percent of your final grade. It is due on Friday, December 8th.

### **Course Schedule and Readings**

The readings for each week are listed in alphabetical order. Some deal with the same question and speak directly to one another, while others focus on somewhat different issues. For your convenience, I will discuss the way the next set of readings can be grouped together at the end of each class meeting. The reading list for each week may be changed during the course of the semester. If you have a particularly interesting reading in mind for a topic close to your research interests, please feel free to suggest it!

### **1. The State: What can its origins tell us about its behavior? (August 23)**

- Abramson, Scott F. 2017. "The Economic Origins of the Territorial State." *International Organization* 71(4): 97-130.
- Bean, Richard. 1973. "War and the Birth of the State." *Journal of Economic History* 33(1): 203-21.
- Blaydes, Lisa, and Christopher Paik. 2016. "The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe." *International Organization* 70(2): 551-86.
- Block, Fred. 1984 [1977]. "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State." In *The Political Economy*, ed. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 32-46.
- Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. New York: Cambridge University Press. 169-91.

### **2. No class meeting: APSA meeting (August 30)**

#### **3. Leaders (September 6)**

- Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. 2015. *Why Leaders Fight*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

#### **4. Individual and Group Processes (September 13)**

- Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63 (3): 689-718.
- McDermott, Rose. 2015. "Sex and Death: Gender Differences in Aggression and Motivations for Violence." *International Organization* 69(2): 753-75.
- Renshon, Jonathan. 2015. "Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders." *International Organization* 69(2): 659-95.
- Rhodes, Edward. 1994. "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Evidence from the Case of the U.S. Navy." *World Politics* 47 (1): 1-41.
- Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2017. "No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision Making." *International Organization* 71(S1): S219-S247.

#### **5. Domestic institutions I (September 20)**

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2009. "A Political Economy of Aid." *International Organization* 63(2): 309-40.
- Colgan, Jeff D., and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2015. "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict." *International Organization* 69(4): 163-94.

Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53 (4): 669-698.

Mattes, Michaela, Brett Ashley Leeds, and Royce Carroll. 2015. "Leadership Turnover and Foreign Policy Change: Societal Interests, Domestic Institutions, and Voting in the United Nations." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(2): 280-90.

#### **6. Domestic institutions II (September 27)**

Baum, Matthew, and Philip B. K. Potter. 2015. *War and Democratic Constraint*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

#### **7. Political competition (October 4)**

Colaresi, Michael. 2004. "When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 555-70.

Ellsberg, Daniel. 1972. "The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine." *Papers on the War*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Rickard, Stephanie J., and Teri L. Caraway. 2014. "International Negotiations in the Shadow of National Elections." *International Organization* 68(2): 701-20.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59 (1): 1-38.

#### **8. Economic interests I (October 11)**

Bearce, David H. 2003. "Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes." *International Organization* 57 (2): 373-410.

Brooks, Stephen G. 2013. "Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace." *International Organization* 67(3): 863-88.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1988. "Sectoral conflict and United States foreign economic policy." *International Organization* 42(1): 59-90.

Frieden, Jeffrey. 1994. "International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation." *International Organization* 48(4): 559-93.

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Benjamin I. Page. 2005. "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *American Political Science Review* 99 (1): 107-23.

#### **9. Economic interests II (October 18)**

Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. *Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

#### **10. Hierarchy and status (October 25)**

Butt, Ahsan I. 2013. "Anarchy and Hierarchy in International Relations: Examining South America's War-Prone Decade, 1932-41." *International Organization* 67(2): 575-607.

- Dafoe, Allen, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. 2014. "Reputation and Status as Motives for War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 371–93.
- Ikenberry, G. John, and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. "Socialization and hegemonic power." *International Organization* 44(3): 283-315.
- Lake, David A. 1996. "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations." *International Organization* 50(1): 1-33.
- McDonald, Patrick J. 2015. "Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace." *International Organization* 69(2): 557-88.

### **11. Influence and asymmetry (November 1)**

- Carter, David B., and Randall W. Stone. 2015. "Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly." *International Organization* 69(4): 1-33.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1971. "The Big Influence of Small Allies." *Foreign Policy* 2: 161-182.
- McKeown, Timothy J. 2009. "The Big Influence of Big Allies." In Helen Milner and Andrew Moravcsik, eds., *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 204-22. [Note that the PDF contains the reference list for the entire edited volume, and so may not need to be printed when you read the article.]
- Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 904-933.
- Robinson, Ronald. 1972. "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration." In *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*. London: Longman. 117-41.

### **11. International Institutions (November 8)**

- Lall, Ranjit. 2017. "Beyond Institutional Design: Explaining the Performance of International Organizations." *International Organization* 71(1): 245-80.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties." *International Organization* 57 (4): 801-27.
- Milewicz, Karolina M., and Duncan Snidal. 2016. "Cooperation by Treaty: The Role of Multilateral Powers
- Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2010. "Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy, 1975–2000." *International Organization* 64(1): 65-96.
- Simmons, Beth A., and Hyeran Jo. 2016. "Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?" *International Organization* 70(2): 443-75.

### **12. Public Opinion I (November 15)**

- Berinsky, Adam. 2009. *In Time of War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

### **13. No class meeting (November 22)**

### **14. Public Opinion II (November 29)**

Fordham, Benjamin O. 2016. "Historical Perspective on Public Support for the Draft: War Costs and Military Service." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1(4): 303-22.

Grossman, Guy, Devorah Manekin, and Dan Miodownik. 2015. "The Political Legacies of Combat: Attitudes Toward War and Peace Among Israeli Ex-Combatants." *International Organization* 69(3): 981–1009.

Herrmann, Richard K. 2017. "How Attachments to the Nation Shape Beliefs About the World: A Theory of Motivated Reasoning." *International Organization* 71(S1): S61–S84.

Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 593-608.